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OHAP'l'ER I 
'1'81: PROBLb 
A disoussion of the faoulties of the soul should not be 
without some interest to modern scholastio philosophers. 
faoulty psyohology, if we may use the modern term of derision, 
is the framework around whioh nearly all of soholastio psy-
oho1ogy is built. Pick up almost any textbook of soho1astio 
psyohology, and you will find that the whole of our psyoho1og-
ioa1 experience is divided and subdivided and treated under the 
head of faoulties. Vegetation, sensation, inte11eotion, vol-
ition, 10oomotion, all are oonsidered under the aspeot of fao-
u1ties. Modern psyoho1ogy, on the other hand, is quite oon-
sistent in its reprobation of nfaou~ty psyoho10gy.' The Enoy-
olopedia Britannica in its brief artiole on this subjeot, says: 
"faoulty psyoho1ogy" is the name given to 
the older psyohology whioh "explained· the 
various mental prooesses by referenoe to 
oorresponding faoulties which exeroise 
them. Although the faculty psychology has 
been frequently derided from the days of 
Looke onwards, it is not entirely dead, 
for it still seems to haunt some of the 
latest books OD1PSyohology in the guise of 'abilities.' 
1 Enclo1opedia Britannioa, 14th ed., IX, 32 
1 
Again S.S. Oolvin in his work, The Learning Prooess, sfYs: 
The faculty psyohology of the last century 
is long since dead, and its resting plaoe 
almost has been forgotten by the soientists 
of today; its ghost, however, stalks abroad 
among the masses, and its spirit still 
lives in the pedagogioal theories of many 
an unoritical thinker. 2 
a 
These are but samples of the widespread opprobrium heaped 
upon faoulty psyohology, so widespread in faot, that "there 
have been few psyohologists or educators who have not taken a 
fling at its supposed absurdities."3 
Sinoe faoulty psyohology then is the framework for nearly 
all of Soholastio psychology and at the same time meets with 
almost universal disapproval among modern non-Scholastic psy-
chologists, investigation of this apparently sad state of 
affairs does not seem to be out of plaoe. 
The problem in its broadest outline seems to come to this: 
Are we soholastios wrong in propounding the faoulty theory, or 
are the moderns wrong in repudiating it? In some oases the 
verdict may be against the latter. In other oases, however, 
we may perhaps find that neither are wrong. It may be that 
-':- '~ 
what the moderns repudiate under the name of faculties, 
Soholastics themselves would be the first to condemn. 
2 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning process, Maomillan, N.Y., 1922, 
212-213 
3 O.A. Bart, Thomistic Ooncept of Mental Facultl, Oath. Univ. 
of Amer., 1930, 1. 
3 
It is important to note here that it would be an gver-
« 
simp1ifioation of the problem to infer that all critioism of 
faculty psychology is directed against the psychology of the 
Scbools. Suoh, in point of faot, is not the case. Herbart's 
oriticism of tbe faculties, for example, was directed ~imari1y 
against the philosophy of Wolff and Kant. Yet sinoe, as we have 
said, faoulty psychology penetrates Soholastio psyohology almost 
to the oore, any attaok on the faoulties would, apparently at 
least, be a oriticism of the Soholastio position. It will be a 
point of this thesis to show, however, that such an inferenoe 
is unjust, and that some oriticisms of the faoulties are en-
tirely justified, not because they oritioize the theory as pro-
pounded by Soholastio philosophers, but beoause they critioize 
adulterations of that theory. 
After this rather broad view of the problem we oome now 
--
to a statement of the speoifio purpose of the thesis. It will 
be to outline the dootrine of the faoulties of the soul aocord-
ing to the philosophy of St. Thomas, to present a oross-section 
of the many indictments against the faoulties and faculty psy-
chology, and to give an evaluation of these indiotments in~the 
light of the Thomistic position. It will not,then,attempt to 
prove the validity of St. Thomas' dootrine, nor will it attempt 
to show the error of any opposing system. Its purpose is 
merely to investigate and present St. Thomas' position on the 
faoulties,and then to examine the validity of some of ,he 
objeotions against his doctrine of the faculties. 
Althougb Sobolastic faoulty psyohology is not to be iden-
tified with Thomistio faoulty psyohology (for there are sohools 
within Scholasticism whioh differ with St. Tbomas on tbe 
dootrine of faoulties); yet, wben and if we aohieve the specific 
purpose of this thesis, which is to study Thomistic faculty psy-
chology in the light of modern opposition, we will at the same 
time be throwing light on the broader problem of the relation-
ship between Soholastic faoulty psyohology as suoh and those 
same modern critics. 
It is important to note at the outset that St. Thomas' 
approaoh to the problem is oertainly not that of an eduoator, 
nor preoisely that of a psyohologist, but predominantly that 
of a metaphysioian. He is interested prinoipally in the 
ultimate oauses of our psyohio experiences. !he modern approaoh, 
on the other hand, veering away from, and even in some oases 
denying the validity of metaphysios, is very largely that of 
the eduoator, the eduoational psyohologist, and the empirio.l 
~ j 
psyohologist. This very differenoe of approaoh is one of the 
prinoiple, souroes of the misunderstanding wbich has given rise 
to so muob abuse against 'faculty psyobology.· 
The prooedure to be followed in aohieving the speoific 
purpose of the thesis is suggested by that very purpose. First 
s 
5 
in order will be the outline of the Thomistic posi tiol\. 10l10w- i 
ing this will come the presentation of the opposing views. 
loW, one source of opposi tion to the faculty theory ia the in-
congruity of this doctrine with the philosophical systems of 
oertain modern philosophera. Accordingly, w. shall trace the 
fortunes of the faculty theory through the philosophies of Bome 
of the more prominent of the modern philosophers. We shall in 
this way see that the opposition on the part of some phil-
osophers was demanded by the logiC of their own system of 
thought. 
After having traced the theory in this manner through the 
.ystems of some of the modern philosophers, we shall group the 
great number of objections found in later writers according to 
general types and then discuss in turn each of the typical 
positions. To attempt an answer to -each individual objection 
would be a wearisome and fruitless process, for, stripped of 
their accidental differences, nearly all these objections turn 
out to be one of three or four general categories, and for our 
purpose it will suffice to handle them as such. 
1'_ .. __ ------------------------------
..,' 
OHAPTER I I 
THOMISTIO OONCEPT OF FACULTY 
Faculties play so important a part in St. Thomas' notion 
of tbe soul, that we find a number of references to them in his 
various works. In arranging, therefore, an outline of his 
position we have not limited ourselves to references from any 
ODe of his works, but have gathered them from several treatises. 
st. Thomas, in the true Aristotelian fashion, is concerned 
wi th the explanation of things. The point of departure in his 
philosophy is not some sort of abstract idea but the concrete 
data of experienoe. All of us, he would say, ,are conscious of 
very definite and at the same time diverse psycbical phenomena. 
'Ie hear, we feel, we touch, we saell, we see, (acts of external 
senses); we attribute disparate sensations to the same object, 
we imagine, we remember, we have instinctive acts, (acts of 
internal senses); we think, we Will, we have intellectual 
memory, (acts of intellectual faculties). low what is the 
principle, the origin, the cause of these conscious experiences? 
Let us be more specific. I inhale the sweet perfume of a 
delicately scented rose. What within me produces this activity? 
We presc1nd here from the odor as partial cause, and consider 
6 
-'_.------------------------------I"'" 
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only the subjeotive oause. Does this sensation of smell oome 
from the soul direotly, from a faoulty, from the suppositum 
(we are told: aotiones Bunt suppositorum)? Soholastios dis-
tinguish. My act of sensing the delioate perfume of the rose 
bas a fourfold prinCiple. There is the remote principle which, 
(prinoipium quod remotum) acts, and that is the suppositum. I 
am the one who smells the rose. Then there is the proximate 
Erinciple which (principium quod proximum) acts, and that is 
the sensorium. My nose is the proximate principle which smells. 
Again there is the remote principle by which (principium quo 
remotum) I aot, and that is the soul or vital prinoiple. It is 
by means of the sensitive power of my soul that I smell the 
rose. Lastly, there is a proximate prinoiple by whioh 
(principium quo proximum) I aot, and that is the faoulty. I 
smell by reason of my smelling facul~y, or sense of smell. 
Now the problem that confronts us is just this;- what 
preCisely is this principium quo proximu~, this faoultl, and 
how does it differ, if at all, from the soul itself, the prin-
oipium quo remotum? Are the different faculties nothing but 
... ~ 
the soul itself looked at from the point of view of its differ-
ent activities? Or are the faculties entities really distinot 
from the soul; not independent from the soul, it is true, but 
really distinot entities inhering in the soul, through whioh 
pi 
8 
the soul aots? In other words, are the faoultles only'.ration-
ally distinot from the soul, or are they really distinot from 
it, as ~ from £!!? And if they are really distlnot, are they 
distinot as substanoe from substanoe, as, for example, one book 
from another; or as substanoe from aocident, as redness from a 
red book? 
There are, as St. Thomas says, some who think that the 
faculties are nothing other than the essenoe of the soul itself, 
considered under the aspect of its dlfferent operations. In 
the Questio Disputata de Splrituallbua Oreaturls, under 
Artlcle II, he remarks: 
Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt 
potentias anlmae non esse allud quam ipsam 
eius essentiam, ita quod una et eadem 
essentia animae, secundum quod est pr1n-
o1p1um sensit1vae operation1s, dicitur 
sensus; seoundum vero quod est 1ntellect-
ualis operation18 prino1plum, dio1tur 
1ntelleotus, et sic de a1ii8. Et ad hoo 
praecipue vldentur moti fulsse, ut 
Avlcenna d1c1t, propter s1mplicitatem 
animae •••• Sedlhaeo pos1tio est oanino 
1mpossib11is. 
Aga1n, in his Quaestl0 D18putata de Ant.a, under Artlole 12, 
" , 
·Utrum an1ma slt suae potent1ae,· he says: 
Ponentes 19ltur, quod anlma sit suae 
potentiae, hoc'intelligunt, quod 1psa 
essent1a animae sit pr1ncipium immediatum 
omnium operat10num animae; dioentes quod 
homo per essentiam ani mae intel11g1t, 
sent1t, et alia hulusmodl operatur, et 
1 S. Thomas Aquinas, ~uaestlones D18¥utatae, Mariettl, Taurinl-
Romae, 1931, Vol. I , De Spiritual bus oreaturis, a.l1, oorp. 
p 
[essentia animae] secundum diversitatem 
operationum, diversia nominibus nominatur; 
aensus qu1dem in quantum est principium 
sentiendi, intellectua autem in quantum 
eat intelligendi principium, et sic de· 
ali1s •••• S8d haec opinio stare non potest.a 
.' 
These two quotations make it amply clear that for St. Thomas 
9 
the faculties were certainly something other than the mere 
essence of the soul. So far, however, he has only affirmed 
that such a doctrine is impossible. Does he adduoe any 
arguments to ahow such a position impossible? He does; de-
cidedly ao. Of the arguments he proposed, we shall note 
firstly, the one he seems to insist on most strongly. It comes 
to this: an act is in the same order of being as the potency to 
which it is ordained. Thus if the act is an accident, the 
potency too is an aooident; if a substance, the potency too is 
a substance. But the act in this c&se,--the operations of the 
soul,--is an accident, for only in God are the operatiOns and 
the substanoe one (in solo Deo est operatio eius substantia). 
Sinoe therefore, in all creatures the operations are accidents, 
so too are the potencies. Therefore, the potenoies or faculties 
are aocidents, and not part of the substance or essence of the 
soul. Now let us hear St. Thomas: 
Respondeo dioendum quod impossible est dicere 
quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; lioet 
hoc quid em posuerint; et hoc duplioiter osten-
ditur •••• Primo, quia cum potentia et actus 
dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, oportet 
a S. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Dis~utatae,.Karietti, Tourini-
Romae 1931 Vol. II De Anima a.~, oorp. 
# 
quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et 
aotus; et ideo, si actus non est in genere 
8ub8tantiae, potentia quae dic1tur ad 
ilIum actum, non pote8t esse in genere 
substantiae. Operatio autem animae non 
est in genere 8ubstantiae, sed in 8010 Deo 
operatio est eius substantia. UDde Dei 
potentia quae est operationis principium, 
est ipsa Dei essentia; quod non potest esse 
verum neque in3anima, neque in aliqua oreatura •••••• 
10 
.' 
Let us now add a few of the subsidiary arguments given by St. 
Thomas. 
Impossible apparet (quodessentia animae 
sit suae potentiae) hoc speoiali ratione 
in anima •••• Primo quidem quia essentia 
una est, in potentiis autem oportet ponere 
multitudinem propter diversitatem aotuum 
et objectorum. Oportet enim potentias 
seoundum actus d1!ersifioar1, cum potentia 
ad aotum dioatur. 
The oonclusion th~refore i8 evident: the soul i8 one; the 
faculties or potentiae are many. Therefore, they cannot be 
identified. St. Thomas goes on: 
Apparet idem ex ord1ne potentiarum animae, 
et habitudine earum ad invicem; invenitur 
enim quod una aliam movet, siout ratio 
irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et in-
tellectus voluntatem; quod esse non potest 
si omnes potentiae e8sent ipsa animae 
essentia, quia idem~ecundem idem non movet 
8eipsum, ut pro bat Philosophus. Relinquitur +~ 
ergo quod potent1ae animae non sunt ipsa 
eius essentia. 5 
3 S. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Marietti, Taurin1, 1937, 
Tom. I, I, q. 77, a. 1, corp. of. also q. 79, a. 1, corp., 
q. 54, a. l, corp., q. 54, a. 3, corp., Sent. l, d18t. 5, 
q. IV, a. 2. 
4 Aqu1na8, De Spir1tual1bus Oreat18, a.ll, corp. 
5 Ibid. 
11 
The faculties then are not identical with the soul. But 
if they are not identical with the soul, they must be distinct. 
If they are distinct they are either substances or accidents. 
They cannot be substances, as we have already shown, for as 
potencies they are in the same order of being as their corres-
ponding acts. But the corresponding acts are, as we have shown, 
accidents. Therefore, the potencies or faculties too must be 
accidents; accidents inhering in the soul alone in the case of 
the purely spiritual or inorganic faculties, or in th.e compos-
ite in the case of the organic faculties. Let us hear St. 
Thomas on this point: 
Ion enim inter substantiam et accidens 
potest esse aliquid medium, cum sub-
stantia et accidens dividant ens per 
affirmationem et negatio,nem; oum pro-
prium substantiae sit non esse in sub-jecto, accidentis vera sit in subjecto 
esse. Unde si potentiae animae non sunt 
ipsa essentia animae (et manifestum est 
quod non sunt aliae substantiae) sequitur 
quod sunt accidentia in aliquo novem 
generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda 
specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia 
vel impotentia naturalis. 6 
Oonsidered thus from the viewpoint of the praedicaments, the 
faoulties are aCCidents, qualities. Considered however, f~~m 
the viewpoint of the praedicables, they are, as St. Thomas goes 
on to say, in the same article, ·proprietates naturales vel 
essentiales, id est essentiam animae naturaliter consequentes." , 
6 Ibid. 
? Ibid. 
- .1 
p 
12 
Let us noW draw together what we have so far see~~ The 
faculties are not the essence of the soul considered merely 
under different aspects, but are realities distinot from, though 
not independent of, the soul. They are aocidents, qualities 
inhering in the soul. They are proprietates naturales, whioh 
though not part of the essence, follow naturally from the 
essence of the soul. 
Let us here note for future reference, with what degree 
of certitude St. Thomas holds this thesis of the real dis-
tinction between the soul and its faculties. Now the two 
opinions, namely, a real distinction and the absence of a real 
distinotion, are oontradictory positions. If then the Angelio 
Dootor says that the opinion opposed to his nest omnino im-
possibiliS,n 8 or that ·stare non potest,n9 we may safely in-
fer, I think, that he held his position as certain. 
We have so far been disoussing the nature of the faoulties, 
What they are; let us oonsider now how they operate, how they 
!2!!. Do they operate of their own right, independently of the 
soul? If not, how do they operate? Does the soul, as prime 
mover, so to speak, work through them, by means of them? 
8 Ibid. 
Soiendum quod potentia nihil aliud est quam 
prinoipium operationi. alicuius, sive sit 
actio sive passio; non quidem prinoip1um 
9 Aquinas, De Anima, a.12, corp. 
Pi 
quod est subjeotum agens aut patiens; sed 10.' 
id quo agens agit, aut patiens patitur •••• 
13 
From this it beoomes olear that, as Father Maher so well 
says, 
A mental power or faoulty is not •••• an in-
dependent reality (note that he does not 
say it is not a distinct reality, but that 
it is not an independent reality], a 
separate agent, whioh originates oonsoioUfl 
states out of itself apart from the mind. 
That gives us some idea of how the faoulties do not operate. 
How then do they operate? What is their funotion in the 
opera tiona of the soul? Again let us hear at. Thomas: 
Ion quidem (est faoultas) prinoipium quod 
est subjeotum agens'aut patiens, sed id 
quo agens agit, aut patiena patitur, 
siout ars aedifioativa est potentia in 
aedifioatore, qui per eam aedifioatj et 
oalor in igne, qui oalore oalefaoit; et 
siooum est potentia in lignis, quia 
seoundum hoo sunt oombustibilia.12 
Aooordingly we may with rather Siwek say: 
Ex diotis apparet potentias operativas 
animae aequiparari posse instrumentis, 
quibus artista utitur in opere suo 
perfioiendo; at baeo instrumefta sunt 
naturaliter animae ooniunota. 3 
Likewise rather Oaloagno tells us in his exoellent treatment of 
the faoulties, that the aotion of the soul and its faoulties is 
10 Ibid. 
11 K. Kaher, S.J., Psyohology, 9th edition, Longmans, London, 
1933, 36. 
12 Aquinas, De Anima, a.12, oorp. 
13 P. Siwek, a.J., PSlohologia Ketaphysioa, Univ. Gregoriana, 
p 
not a double aoti·on, one part of whioh prooeeds from ~e faoulty 
itself, the other from the soul; but that there is but one 
single aotion prooeeding at onoe from both the soul and the 
faoulty, just as the aot of painting is one aot that prooeeds 
alike from the painter and from his brush. 
(raoultates) se habent ad modum instrumenti, 
quod agit quidem, sed aotione quae per 
prius est a oausa principali. Unde sicut 
non proprie penicillus pingit, sed homo per 
penicillum, ita non proprie intelleflus 
oogitat, sed anima per intellectum. 
All along we have been speaking of faoulties, assuming 
that there is more than one faoulty. The assumption, however, 
is not gratuitous. St. Thomas holds that there is a plurality 
of faoulties,15 and says that they are distinguished one from 
. another by their aots and objects--Distinguuntur per aotus et 
objeota. 'or, as we know, a potenoy i8 essentially orda1ned 
to its aot, in suoh wise that the potenoy is known only insofar I 
as its aot is known. Again, an aot is always ordained to some 
objeot, material objeot in vegetative and sensitive life, im-
material in intelleotual life. The objeot, of oourse, that 
distinguishes the aot is the formal object, for the same +~ 
material object, for example, our sweet red rose, may oause two 
specifioally different aots--the aots of smelling and of seeing 
14 r.x. Oalcagno, S.J., Philosophia Soholast1oa, K. d'Auria, 
Heapoli, 1937, II, 17. 
15 Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 77, a. B. 
__ 2 
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and,benoe,oould not be said to differentiate the facul~ies. 
The faculties,then,are distinguished proximately by their acts, 
but remotely by the formal objeots. Here is the way St. Thomas 
puts it: 
Respondeo dioendum quod potentia seoundum 
lllud quod est potentia ordinatur ad aotum. 
Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex 
actu ad quem ordinaturj et per oonsequens 
oportet quod ratio potentiae diversifloatur, 
ut dlversifioatur ratio actus. Ratio autem 
actus diversifioatur seoundum diversam 
rationem objeoti; omnis enim actl0 vel est 
potentiae activae vel passivae. Objeotum 
autem comparatur ad aotum potentiae passivae 
slcut prinoiplum et oausa moven8; ••••• Ad 
aotum autem potentiae activae oomparatur 
objeotum ut terminus et finis ••• Ex hi8 
autem duobus actio speoiem reoipit, soilioet 
ex principio, vel ex termino ••••.• Unde 
neOesse est quod potentiae diversifioentur 
seoundum aotus et objecta. lS 
There are different faoulties then, whioh are distinguished 
one from another by their formal objects. But what in the 
concrete are these faoulties? In other Words, how does St. 
Thomas olasslfy them? 
There are, first of all, three klnds of souls, vegetative, 
sensitlve, and intelleotual; and the faoulties may oorrespond-
1!- ;-
ingly be divided into the vegetative, sensitive and intelleotual 
faoultles. 1? The basis of this division is the degree in whioh 
the operations of the soul surpass the operations of natural 
bodies. 
16 
Another division, more detailed than the first, i~ the 
division according to the five genera of faculties,--the 
vegetative, sensitive, intelleotual, appetitive and locomotive 
faculties. The basis of division in this case is the univer-
sality of the object and the manner by which the soul attains 
it.1S 
At this juncture a question may arise as to the unity of 
the soul. If the faculties are entities really distinct from 
the soul, how can the soul be said to be one? We answer that 
a thing is one, or more than one, by reason of its substance. 
There exist two units, two una per se, only where there exist 
two complete substances. Now the faculties are aooidents or 
propria, and as such do not form part of the essence or sub-
stance of the soul. Acoordingly,they may be distinct between 
themselves and from the soul without oausing any distinction 
in the substanoe of the soul, and without therefore, destroying 
the soul's unity. 
Such,then,in sketchy form are some of the main points of 
St. Thomas' doctrine on the faculties. According to that ~r 
doctrine, the faculties are not merely ways of classifying the 
different psychic phenomena produced by the soul; they are 
re~lities, really distinct from the soul, yet not so distinct 
as to be independent of the soul either in being or in operation 
18 Ibid., q. 78, a. 1. 
17 
.' They are accidents inhering in the soul, qualities of the soul, 
proprietates naturales, which the soul uses as quasi-instruments 
in the production of psychio acts. The faoulties do not hear, 
see, feel, think, will, and so on, but the soul by and through 
the faculties produces these aots. The faoulties are dis-
tinguished from one another by reason of tbeir formal objects, 
and may be classified into vegetative, sensitive, and intelleot-
ual faoulties aocording as their operations surpass the opera-
tions of natural bodies, or into vegetative, sensitive, in-
telleotual, appetitive or looomotive, according to the division 
of the five g~nera of faculties. That, in brief summary, we 
may say is the Thomistio doctrine of the faoulties. 
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CHAP'l'IR I I I 
FACULTY OONCEPT FRO¥ OCCAM TO LEIBNITZ 
Having oompleted the disoussion of the faoulties aooording 
to the philosophy of St. Thomas, we are faced noW with the 
problem of traoing the fortunes of this theory through the 
maze of philosophic thought sinoe his time. Of the various 
possible ways of oonducting this investigation, we Will, as 
noted above, use the following: first, we will oonsider 
separately some of the more prominent of the early modern 
philosophers., to see what plaoe was aooorded to the faoul ty 
theory in their philosophy. Secondly, since there is a super-
abundance of material relative to our problem to be found in 
the writings of the more reoent modern psyohologists and 
thinkers, it will be more to our purpose to oategorize the 
matter they present, and then to handle oollectively the 
material found in eaoh oategory. This, aooordingly, is the 
course we shall pursue. 
The first major diversion from the dootrine of· the 
faoulties as presented by St. Thomas Was that offered by the 
Nominalists under the leadership of William of Oooam. Tbough 
lominalism did not limit itaelf to the field of psychology but 
18 
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permeated through the whole field of philosophy, it coftcerns us 
only insofar as it vitiates the Thomistio oonoept of the 
faoulty. Aooording to the nominalists, the faculties had not 
real existenoe. They were not entia realia; they were merely 
nomina. They were nothing more than mere names aooording to 
whioh we may conveniently classify mental phenomena. Pirotta 
clearly and succinctly analyzes their position: 
Prima sententia quamlibet distinotionem 
praeter nominal em sive conceptualem seu 
ex modo significandi, negat, quatenus 
scilioet ipsa animae essentia est per 
seipsam proximum prinoipium operationum, 
at ideo eadem essentia animae quia in-
telligit, dicitur vel significatur ut 
intelleotus, quia vult, voluntas, etc., 
oonsequenter potentiae non sunt nisi 
nomina. Ita .ominalistae ••• l 
Dessoir in his discussion of Occam's psyohology makes a some-
what similar statement. He says: 
He is throughout opposed to a multiplicity 
of distinot faculties, and limits the 
notion to that of a multiplicity of 
directions in whioh the soul is aotive. 2 
This attitude toward the faculties attributed to Ocoam deserves 
special attention, for it is a vieWpoint which is predominant 
in nearly the whole of subsequent non-soholastic thought onrthe 
problem. Pirotta marks well this faot, wben, in oonolusion to 
the passage quoted above, he states: 
1 A.M. Pirotta, O.P., Summa Philosophiae, Karii E. Marietti, 
Taurini, 1936, II, 439-440. 
2 K. Dessoir, Outlines of the History of Psychology, Kacmillan, 
Bew York, 1912, 70. 
Ita N'ominalistae tum antiqui ••• tum moderni, .' 
quibua plures alii, auis doctrinis cohaeren-
tes, adbaerent, ut Oartesius et Oartesiani, 
Ocoasionalistae (v.g. Malebranche), Empir-
istae \Locke, Taine) Pseudo-Intellectual-
istae ~v.g. Leibnitz~, Phenomenalistae (v.g. 
Kant et lantiani), Pantheistae (v.g. 
Spinoza), Transcendentalisll! (v.g. 
Schelling, Hegel), Dynamistae-psychici (v.g. 
Berbart, Beneke, Lindner), Rosmini, Galluppi, 
Gerdil et Garnier. 3 
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For a refutation of this positi0nt namely, that the 
faculties are only names or group concepts for the activities 
of the soul, we need only turn to the preceding chapter where 
we will find St. Thomas' explicit treatment of this matter. 
He emphatically denies that the faculties are merely the soul 
itself considered from the viewpoint of its various activities, 
and states with proof that they are real accidental entities 
inhering in the essence of the soul. Suarez also disposes of 
the Nominalists,though not with quite the same dispatoh. 
Potentiae quae ad has (vi tales) operationes 
ordinantur, distinguuntur ex natura rei ab 
ipsa anima. 1st contra N'ominales, et vide-
tur certa. 4 
The Nominalistic or even Oonceptualistic viewpoint of 
faoulties 18 very common among psyohologists of the reoent 
century. It even constitutes for one author, Sir William ~ 
Hamilton, a means of defense against the oritics who accuse the 
3 Pirotta, 440. 
4 Francis Suarez, S.J., Opera Omnia, Ludovicum Vives, Paria, 
1856, Vol. 3, De Anima, II, o. 1, n. 4. 
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faculties of being ISO many distinct and independent a5ist-
enees •15 
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We pass noW from Ocoam and the Nominalists to the early 
modern philosophers. Undoubtedly the first big name on the 
list of modern non-soholastio philosophers is that of Franois 
Bacon. It has been said6 that Baoon i8 to be judged rather on 
the method whioh he inaugurated than on the oontent of his 
system. Oertainly his content relative to the faoulties 
differs little, if at all, from the traditional soholastic 
vieW. In the third ohapter of the fourth book of De Augmentis 
Scientiarum, he aa18: 
Secunda igitur partitio (ciroa animam humanam) 
fit, in dootrinam de substantia et faoul-
tatibus animae, et d~otrinam de uau et 
objectia faoultatum. 
From thia it seema we oan conolude t~t,implioitely at least, 
he distinguishes between the substanoe and the faoulties of the 
soul; henoe they are not identical. Moreover, he seems like-
wise to 'differentiate between the faculty and its use or 
function; henoe they are not merely names to designate the 
5 Sir William Hamilton, Leotures on Metaphisics and Logio, 
Gould & Linooln, Boaton, 1868, I, 267-27 , oir. esp. 
pp. 268-269. 
6 W. Turner, History of PhilosOphy, Ginn, New York, 1929, 437. 
7 Francis Baoon, The Works of Franois Baoon, London, 1740, 
Vol. I, De Augmentis Sci ent iarum, Bk. IV, o. 3, 132. 
aa 
•• rioUS functions of the soul, for If they were merely~ntended 
to be names for the functions, they certainly would not be used 
to designate the principles from which the functions flow, as 
the above quotations seem to indloate that they are. 
That such deductions are not merely Implicit In his work, 
.ut tbat he held a variety of faculties, and that, If not 
tully satisfied, he was at least concerned about the nature of 
tbeir distinction from the soul, we may gather from the follow-
iag: 
Faoultates autem anlmae notlsslmae sunt; 
intelleotus, ratio, phantasla, memoria, 
appetltus, voluntas; denique unlversae 
illae, circa quas versantur scientlae 
logloae et ethicae: Sed In dootrlna de 
anima origines ips arum traotarl debent, 
idque physioe, prout animae lnnatae sint, 
et lnbaereant: usus tantum ips&rum, et 
objecta, i1lis alteris artibus deputantur. 8 
It is interesting to note in this connection Bacon's use of 
the subjunctive mood in the phrase 'prout innatae !!ai et !!-
baereant." In the doctrine of the soul, he says, the origin 
of the faculties ought to be Investigated, as they may be 
innate and adhering in the soul. Aooordingly, Bacon does not 
aeem to be quite so certain as St. Thomas about the nature of 
the faculties and their relationship to the soul. 
It seems, therefore, that we oan say without fear of over-
atatement that Baoon's philosophy of the nature of the 
-
• Bacon Bk. IV o. 3, 133. 
facul ties when compared with tbat of later philosopher.', 
follows olosely enough the Thomistio tradition. 
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Although, chronologioally speaking, Baoon may be oon-
sidered the first in importanoe among modern non-scholastic 
philosophers, yet from the viewpoint of his influenoe on the 
whole trend of modern philosophy, Desoartes undoubtedly holds 
first rank among all modern philosophers. Oertainly his views 
regarding the problem under disoussion are of prime importanoe, 
not beoause of any astounding revolution he inauguxated in the 
dootrine of the faoulties, but beoause, by his dootrine of the 
soul, and of the oomplete independenoe of the soul in its 
aotivity from the body, he prepared the ground for exoessive 
subjeotive ideali8m on the one hand and gross materialism on 
the other, both of whioh extremes, reduotively, have had great 
influenoe on the question of the faoulties. 
In order to understand wbat Desoartes thought oonoerning 
the faoulties, it is first neoessary for us to get a glimpse 
at what he considered to be the nature of the mind, for on his 
view of the nature of the mind will depend in large measur&-', 
his view conoerning the nature of the mind's faculties. 
low the word substanoe, Desoartes says, may be attributed 
univooally to soul and body, and the prinoipal property of 
eaoh oonstitutes its essenoe. But sinoe thought is the prin-
oiple 'Pl"operty of the thinking substanoe, and extension the 
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prinoiple property of oorporeal substanoe, thought and.exten-
sion oonstitute the essenoe of mind and body respeotively.9 
The immediate oonsequence of this is that thought and mind 
are not at all two things, but if distinct at all, are only 
rationally distinot. And indeed we cannot accuse Descartes 
here of any want of logic, for he says: 
For we experience some diffioulty in 
abstraoting the notions that we have of 
substanoe from those of thought or exten-
sion, for they in truth 80 not differ but 
in thought (ratione) ••• l 
If, then, thought constitutes the essence of the soul's sub-
stance, what relation Will the other aotivities of the mind 
(such as memory, immagination, volition) have to the soul. 
These aotivities, he states quite logically, are different 
types or modes of thought. • ••• everything that we find in mind 
is but so many diverse forms of thinking.Hll 
With mind then in reality identical with thought, and 
with all the mental activity considered as modes or variations 
of thought, it would be relatively safe to conclude without 
further inquiry into his writings that he held that the mind 
9 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trl. 
by E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross, University Press, Oambridge, 
1931, Principles of PhilosophY, Part I, Princ. LIII, Vol. I, 
240, and also Princ. LXIII, Vol. I, 245. 
10 Ibid., Part I, Princ. LXIII, Vol. I, 248. 
11 Ibid., Part I, Princ. LIII, Vol. I, 240, Princ. LXV, Vol. I, 
248. 
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and the one fao.ul ty of thought are one and the same thing. We 
are not surprised then when we read: 
••• no one before me, so far as I know, 
asserted that mind oonsisted in one thin~ 
alone, namely the faoulty of thinkiAf an 
the inward souroe (so. of thinking). 2 
Bow, when Desoartes speaks of the faoulty of thought, he 
does not use the term in the Thomistio sense of a potenoy that 
can be aotuated. For, aooording to Desoartes, the essenoe of 
the mind is its aot of thinking, and it is this oontinuous aot 
or prooess of thinking that he loosely denominates a faoulty. 
In one plaoe at least Desoartes dropped a remark on what 
he thought of the prevailing dootrine of faoulties. In the 
seoond part of his treatise on The~as~ions of the Soul, after 
having given his enumeration of the various passions, he gives 
his reason why he is differing in his enumeration from those 
who preoeded him: 
Here we have the order whioh seemB to me 
to be the best for the enumeration of the 
passions. In this I know well that I am 
parting oompany with all those who have 
written on this subjeot before, but it is 
not without great reason that I do so. 
For these derive their enumeration from " 
the faot that they distinguish in the 
sensitive part of the soul two appetites 
whioh they name the oonoupisoent and the 
irasoible respeotively. And beoause in 
the soul I reoognize no distinotion of 
parts, as I bave said above, this seems 
to me to signify nothing but that it has 
two faoulties, the one of desire, and the 
12 Desoartes, Notes Direoted Against A Certain Programme, eto., 
Note 1. Vol. I ~4. 
-other of anger, and because in the same .' 
way it has the faculties of wondering, 
loving, hoping, fearing, and thus of re-
ceiving in itself every other passion ••• 
I do not see why they have desired to 
refer them all to concupiscence or anger. 13 
2S 
If we were to paraphrase this statement, it would seem that his 
thought would run something like this: ·Preceeding enumerations 
of the passions divided them into faculties of desire (concup-
iscible) and anger (irascible). In that case we should also 
have faculties of love, hope, fear, etc., for they are as much 
passions as are anger and desire. But that would be putting 
in the soul a plurality of faculties. Now a plurality of 
faculties would involve a distinction of parts in the soul. 
Therefore, since I recognize in the soul no distinction of 
parts, such an enumeration is unsatisfactory.· 
It is not at all difficult to see then that Descartes' 
pOSition differs radically from the Thomistic doctrine. For 
in the ThomistiC doctrine the faculties are not activities, 
but potencies; the faculties are not limited to one so called 
"faculty: and the plurality that does exist does not involve 
a distinction of parts in the soul, for they are not identi~1ed 
with the essence of the soul, but are qualities really distinct 
from the soul's essence. 
13 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Part II, Art. LXVIII, 
Vol. I, 361-362. 
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To sum up then: the soul or mind according to Des~artes 
is thought, and all other types of mental activity axe but 
~odes of thought. This activity, which Descartes in misleading 
fashion calls the faculty of thOught, constitutes the essence 
of the soul. More than one "faculty" i8 impossible, for to 
posit in the soul any further "faculties" would be to place in 
it a distinction of parts, a thing which, of course, he would 
not permit. 
In any attempt to evaluate the dootrine of Desoartes al 
compared With that of St. Thomas, it is important to remember 
that Desoartes' approach was predominantly epistomologioal, 
whereas the Thomistio approaoh is predominantly metaphysical. 
Since the approaches are different it is difficult to evaluate 
one in terms of the other. Nevertheless some evaluation can 
be made. 
Oertainly it is untenable to identify soul with thought 
merely beoause we can knoW of the soul's substance only by 
knowing its act of thinking. Surely a person who is unconscious 
through siokness or aocident is not deprived of his mind because 
there is a suspension of all thought. Yet that would have to 
be the oonolusion, if we identify the mind's substanoe with its 
act of thinking. To this objeotion Desoartes answers: 
But Why should it not always think, when it 
is a thinking substance? Why is it strange 
that we do not remember the thoughts it has 
had when in the womb or in a stupor, when .' 
we do not even remember the most of those 
we know we have had when grown up, in good 
health, and awake? For the recollection 
of the thoughts which the mind has had during 
the period of its union with the body, it 
is neoessary for certain traoes of them to 
be impressed on the brain; and turning and 
applying itself to these the mind remembers. 
Is it remarkable if the brain of an infant 
or of one in a stupor is unfit to reoeive 
these residual impressions? 
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The immediate conolusion from this pOSition, namely, that 
the mind is a thinking substanoe, or, in other words, that the 
act of thinking is the essenoe of the mind, should be that the 
mind is the pure aot of thought. Acoording to Thomistic meta-
physics, this is olearly impossible in a created being, for 
only God is the Pure Aot of Thought. 
As for Descartes' classifioation of all our prinoiple 
mental acts as different "modes" of thought, we oertainly 
oould agree with him, if we were to change the word "thought" 
to "consoiousness" or "awareness"; for oertainly, if we ex-
olude the mysterious operations of the subconsoious mind, there 
is a oonoomitant oonsciousness or awareness to all our mental 
acts. Henoe all our mental acts are "modes," so to speak, of 
"oonsoiousness," or in Desoartes' terminology, "thought." Now 
there is definite evidence to support the hypotheSiS that 
lawareness" or 'consoiousness" is what Descartes meant by 
"thought." For he says: 
14 Descartes, Reply to Fifth Objections, Ked. II, n. 4, Vol. II, 
a 
By the word thought I understand all that .' 
of whioh we are oonsoious as operating in 
us. And that is why not alone understand-
ing, willing, imagining, but also frlling, 
are here the same thing as thought. 
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Nevertheless it still remains true that oonsoiousness or aware-
ness do not oonstitute the essenoe of mind as they seem to do 
for Desoartes. 
In conclusion then, it seems safe to say that the Oartesian 
and Thomistic oonoept of faculty were diametrically opposed. 
For St. Thomas the faoulties are the proximate principles of 
oonsoious activity, inherent in the soul, and distinot from the 
soul as aooidents from substanoe. Desoartes thought otherwise. 
For him the operations of the souloould be reduoed to one 
activity, thought, whioh he misleadingly oalled a faoulty, 
but whioh in reality was for him identioal with the soul, i.e., 
oonstituting its essence. Hence, the concept of faculty in the 
Thomistic sense was non-existent in the philosophy of Desoartes. 
The psychology of Baruch Spinoza, the next great figure 
after Descartes in the evolution of modern philosophy, is note-
worthy here largely beoause of the similarity of his doctrine 
with that of Descartes, and because he has brought more clearly 
into focus some of the psychological prinCiples enunciated by 
Descartes. Wallace, in his work on Hegel, remarks that in the 
philosophy of Spinoza, -The ideas !r! the mind: mind does not 
15 BBlcartesJ Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Princ. IX, VOl.I, 
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~ ideas,R16 and • ••• the faoulties as suoh are no be~ter than 
entia rationis.,17 Though these remarks savor of the philosophy 
of Desoartes, they were made, as we said, in referenoe to the 
psyohology of Spinoza. 
As in the oase of Desoartes, so in that of Spinoza, if we 
wish to oome to an understanding of his position with regard 
to the faoulties, it is important first of all, and for obvious 
reasons, to understand bis ooncept of~. For Descartes, as 
we saw, that whioh constitutes the mind is its principle 
property, thought. Spinoza 1s even more explicit; for him the 
actual being of the mind is its idea. In the second part of 
his Ethios, on the Nature and Origin of the Kind, we find him 
saying: "Therefore the first part which oonstitutes the actual 
being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing 
aotually existing.R18 Now that individual thing, the idea of 
which constitutes the human mind is the body. "Therefore the 
objeot of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and 
that actually existing.H19 That he really considered tbe idea 
of the body as constituting the ~, is beyond doubt, for in 
16 W. Wallaoe, Hegel's PhilosophY of Mind, Olarendon, Oxford, 
1894, 58. 
17 Ibid., 58. 
18 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Part 2, Prop. XI, trl. by A. Boyle, 
Dutton, New York, 1930, 46. 
19 Ibid., Prop. XIII, 47. 
another plaoe he used the two terms, idea of the body ~d 
the mind as synonyms.SO 
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Since, then, the mind is an idea, or, as he says else-
where,Sl "a fixed and determined mode of thinking," it would 
seem logical to infer that willing, whioh is an activity of the 
mind, must be a form of~. And that is precisely Spinoza's 
position, for he says: "And what we have said of this volition 
(for it was seleoted at random) can be said of any other 
volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. n2S And again 
in even more unmistakable terms he identifies idea and volition, 
intellect and will. 
Will and intellect are nothing but individual 
volitions and ideas. But an individual vol-
ition and idea are one and the same thing. 
Therefore Wail and intellect are one and the 
same thing. 
The conolusions that we oan draw with regard to Spinoza's 
view of the faoulties are obvious. If the mind ~ its idea, 
the idea ceases to be oonsidered a product of the mind. Henoe, 
any notion of a faoulty as the proximate principle in the pro-
duotion of an idea is obviously ruled out. Again, if volition 
. ' 
20 ~., Prop. XXI, 58. 
21 ~., Prop. XLVIII, 74. 
22 Ibid., Prop. XLIX, 76. 
23 Ibid., Prop. XLIX, 76. 
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is the same as intellection, (or to put it more ooncretely, if 
an act of the will is but an idea), and the mind is identified 
with its idea, then there is no room for a faculty of will. 
Therefore, we are not surprised when we read: "There is not 
in the mind an absolute faoulty of willing and unwilling, but 
only individual volitions ••• "24 That disposes of the will as 
a faculty; what about the intelleot? 
In the same manner it may be shown that 
there oannot be found in the mind an 
absolute faculty of understanding, de-
siring, loving, etc. Whenoe it follows 
that these and such like faculties are 
either entirely fictitious, or nothing 
els8 than metaphysical or general 
entities, which we are wont to form 
from individual things: therefore in-
telleot or will have reference in the 
same manner to this or that idea, or to 
this or that volition, as "stonenes8" to 
this is that stone, or man to Peter or 
Paul. 
Faoulties, acoordingly, are one of two things: they are 
either "entirely fiotitious" somethings, .2.£. "metaphysioal or 
general entities whioh we are wont to form from individual 
things;' that is, universal ooncepts. 
Xow Spinoza would certainly seem to be justified in cort-
sidering the faculties entirely fictitious, for if the mind is 
an idea, it would surely need no faculty to form its idea. 
24 ~., Prop. XLIX, 75. 
25 ~., Prop. XLVIII, 75. 
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That would be putting a power of the mind prior to the 4 mind,--
manifestly absurd. Perhaps, however, in view of the prevailing 
tradition, to oall the faoulties "entirely fiotitious" might 
have seemed to Spinoza to be rather abrupt; so he is willing 
to oonoede that if they are not utterly fiotitious, then they 
are at best "metaphysioal or general entities whioh we are wont 
to form from individual things." Thus, he says, "intelleot" 
••• has "referenoe to this or that idea, or (will) to this or 
that volition, as 'stoneness' to this or that stone, or man to 
Peter or Paul." Here we see in its full vigor the nominalistio 
or oonoeptualistio viewpoint of faoulty, a view that is, as we 
said above, very prominent in the whole of modern non-
soholastio psyohology, and one whioh is entirely inoonsistent 
with St. Thomas' oonolusions. For St. Thomas, the faoulties 
are not merely names or oonoepts, but aotually existing real-
ities inhering as aooidents in the substantial soul. 
It is evident that the faoulties are ruled out of the 
psyohology of Spinoza, not beoause of any flaws he found in 
the dootrine as proposed by St. Thomas, but because faoulties 
are inoonsistent with his theory of the nature of the mind. 
Sinoe Spinoza identified the substance of the mind with its 
idea, there is obviously no plaoe in his psyohology for a 
faoulty as a proximate prinoiple of an aot distinot from the 
mind. Destroy or ohange the nature of " the soul, and, of oourse, 
ou destro e the nature of the soul's faoulties. 
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In our approaoh to the dootrine of the faoulties ~oording 
to the philosophy of John Looke, it will not be neoessary for 
us first to enter upon a disoussion of his theory of mind in 
order to understand his position with regard to the faoulties, 
for on the question of faoulties he is very explioit. Very 
little, if any, interpretation of his general psyohologioal 
theories is required in order to arrive at a rather olear under-
standing of what he thought of faoulties. 
Strangely enough, when the present writer was beginning 
his investigation of the problem, it seemed rather apparent 
from the oitations read that Looke was to be a fruitful souroe 
of material for the side of the opposition. Thus BaldWin, in 
his Diotionary of PhilosophY and PSYOhology26 leaves the reader 
under the distinot impression that Looke is an aroh-enemy of 
faoulty psyohology. Stout27 and Muller-Freienfels28 present 
Looke in similar fashion. Spearman also, although a very 
generous defender of the faoulty dootrine, leaves one with the 
same impression; namely, that Looke is an antagonist of the 
dootrine of the faculties. 29 So far i8 this from being the 
26 J.Y. BaldWin, Diotionar~ of PhilosophY and Psyohology, 
Yacmillan, New York, 19~, 369. 
27 G.r. Stout, Manual of Psyohology, Hinds, New York, 1899, 105. 
28 R. Muller-rreienfel8, Evolution of Modern Psyohology, Yale, 
New Haven, 1935, 292. 
29 O. Spearman, Psyohology Down The Ages, Maomillan, London, 
1937, I, 184. 
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case, that anyone who reads more than a few detatched sentences 
will see olearly that Looke is not only a "faculty psyohologist" 
himself, but also goes to great pains to free it from the 
absurdities which might be attaohed to it at the bands of those 
not oareful in their use of terms. 
First of all Looke definitely olaims existence for the two 
principal faculties of "understanding" and "will." 
The two great and prinoipal actions of the 
mind which are most frequently oonsidered, 
and which are so frequent that everyone 
that pleases may take notioe of them in 
himself, are these two: perception or 
thinking, and volition or willing. The 
power of thinking is oalled "the under-
standing" and the power of volition is 
oalled "the will;" and these two powers 
or abilities in the mind are denominated 
" facul ties. II 30 
And in another chapter of the same book he says: 
These powers of the mind, viz., of per-
oeiving and of preferring, are usually 
called by another name: and the ordinary 
way of speaking, is that the understand-
ing a2~ will are two faculties of the 
mind. 
Lest, however, he should be misunderstood when he uses 
the word 'faoulty', Looke proceeds immediately to warn again~t 
an improper use of the term. 
30 John Locke, Essaa On Human Understanding, G. Rutledge & S., London, Bt. II, h. VI,. 2. 
31 Ibid., Bt. II, Oh. XXI, 6. 
••• and the ordinary way of speaking, is 
that the understanding and will are two 
faoulties of the mind; a word proper 
enough, if it be used, as all words should 
be, so as not to breed any oonfusion in 
men's thoughts by being supposed (as I 
suspeot it has been) to stand for some 
real beings in the soul, that performed 
these aotions of understanding and vol-
ition. For when we say, the will is the 
oommanding and superior faoulty of the 
soul; that it is or is not free; that it 
determines the inferior faculties; 
though these and the like expressions ••• 
may be understood in a clear and distinct 
sense; yet I suspeot, I say, that this 
way of speaking of faoulties has misled 
many into a confused notion of so many 
distinot agents in us, whioh had their 
several provinoes and authorities ••• as so 
many distinct beings; whioh has been no 
small occasion of wrangling, obsourity, 
and uDQertainty in questions relating to 
them. 32 
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If many of our modern psyohologists and historians of psy-
ohology, who seem to have a mortal dread of the word 'faoulty', 
were to read this passage of Looke written three oenturies ago, 
they would not merit the 'dig' administered by Spearman against 
those "who wrote more than they read. M33 
The passages quoted above from the writings of Looke 
should be suffioient to establish him as a proponent of th~, 
faoulties in the genuine Thomistic sense of the word, that is, 
as powers of the mind. Moreover, it should not be necessary 
to quote further to show his dislike for the inoorreot usage 
32 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, 6. 
33 Spearman, I, 189. 
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of the term 'faoulty'. But sinoe his mind in this mat~r is so 
muoh akin to the Thomistio position, and sinoe it oomes from 
one who is sometimes presented as an antogonist, we will not 
hesitate to quote a still more explioit olarifioation of what 
he meant when he spoke of the soul's faoulties. The argument 
in the following quotation runs something like this: If the 
faoulties are distinot beings and as such do the aoting, then 
it would be proper to have a separate faculty for every 
different type of operation. But since a faculty is a power, 
and a power is the power of something, it is the something, in 
this case the soul, that does the acting not the distinct 
faoulty. 
• •• if it be reasonable to suppose and 
talk of faculties as distinct beings 
that oan act (as we do when we say, 
"The will orders,· and "The will is 
free,") it is fit that we ~hould make 
a speaking faculty, and a walking faoulty 
and a danoing faoulty .•• ; and we may as 
properly say that it is the Singing 
faculty sings, and the dancing faoulty 
dances, as that the will chooses, or the 
understanding conceives ••. This way of 
talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and 
as I guess produced great confusion. For 
these being all different powers in the 
mind or in the man to do several actions, 
he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the 
power to do one action i8 not operated on 
by the power of doing another action. 
For the power of thinking operates not on 
the power of chOOSing, nor the power of 
chOOSing on the power of thinking ••• I 
grant that this or that aotual thought 
may be the occasion of volition ••• ; or 
the actual 'choice of the mind, the cause 
of actual thinking on this or that thing... .' 
But in all these it is not one pqwer that 
o~rates on another, but it is the mind 
t t operates and exerts these powers; it 
is the man that does the aqtion, it is 3ie 
a~ent that has power, or is able to do. ( ubl1neat1ons not 1n original) 
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It is the first part of this statement, we believe, that writers 
have referred to in considering Locke an enemy of faculty psy-
ohology. If taken alone out of its context, suoh an opinion 
would be justified; taken, however, in its oontext it provides 
an excellent defense for the true faculty concept. There are 
two phrases, however, one in each of the last two quotations, 
that require a little attention, as they may be possible souroes 
of misunderstanding or error. In the first of these two quo-
tations, Locke says that we should not suppose faculties 'to 
stand for some real beings in the soul." And in the second 
quotation, in words with much the same import, he says in 
effect that we should not "talk of faculties as distinct beings 
that can act." Now if he had meant that the faculties were not 
"real beings" but existed only in the rational order, or that 
they were not beings Rdistinct" from the essence of the soul, 
we would, of course, be obliged to consider his poSition to be 
~ , 
in disagreement with that of St. Thomas. But it is obvious 
from the context that Locke was not at all concerned with the 
ultimate metaphysics of these 'powers" of the soul. He was 
satisfied to state that the soul definitely ~ powers or 
34 Locke, Bk. II, Oh. XXI, 17, 18, 19. 
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faculties, and that these powers were not self-subsist~~t, and 
were therefore the powers of something else--in this case the 
soul. Accordingly, he was not concerned about the ultimate 
nature of these powers, nor how they were related in action 
with the substance of which they were the powers. Therefore, 
when he said that the faculties were not "real beings," or 
were not "distinct beings that can act," he very obviously 
meant that they were not independently existing and independent-
ly operating entities,--a point that scholastic philosophers 
insist on most strenuously. 
In view of Locke's position as here presented, Spearman's 
following remark insofar as it refers to Locke seems entirely 
unfounded. 
The bitterest attacks upon the faculties 
go back at least as far as Malebranche, 
who saw in them an opportunity for cen-
suring his chronic foes, the Aristotelian 
Schoolmen. Locke followed suit by making 
them the butt for his keenest satire. 35 
Locke could hardly have made the faculties the "butt of his 
keenest satire" if he himself advocated a faculty theory. 
"His keenest satire" was directed against a misuse of the t~,m 
'faoulty,' for which he should be justly lauded as having 
rendered a great service to, and not an indiotment of, the 
faoul ty theory. 
35 Spearman, I, 184. 
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As in the case of Descartes and Spinoza, so in tha~ of 
Leibnitz, it is necessary, in order to understand his attitude 
toward faculties, to have some general idea of his philosophy 
of mind. 
Leibnitz is famous for his philosophy of monads. According 
to that philosophy monads are incorruptible,36 simp1e37 sub-
stanoes, the ultimate constituents of oreated being. 38 Eaoh of 
these ultimates, though immune to any ohange from an external 
agent,39 is, nevertheless, as a result of an internal prin-
ciple,40 undergoing oontinuous4l internal change. Moreover, in 
each monad there is a particular series of these internal changes, 
which series being different in the different monads constitute 
the specific nature that differentiates them. 42 
So much for the nature of the monad; now about its activitZ. 
The monad, as seen above, is by its very nature continuously 
undergoing change. These continuous internal changes Leibnitz 
calls nperceptions. n43 When the oontinuous ohange from one 
36 Gottfried W. Leibnitz, The ~onadologz, trl. by R. Latta, 
Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univ. Pr., 1925, n.4, 6, 218, 219. 
37 Ibid., n. 1, 217. 
38 Ibid., n. a, 217. ~~~ 
39 Ibid., nne 7, 11, 219, 223. 
40 Ibid., n. 11, 223. 
41 Ibid., n. 10, 222. 
42 Ibid., n. 12, 223. 
43 Ibid., n. 14, 224-225, of. also n. 17, 227-229. 
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perception to another takes place, the activity of the tnternal 
principle that oauses this change is called "Appetition. H44 
All monads have these perceptions and appetitions or desires 
(appetits), and therefore may be called souls. Nevertheless, 
. 
. ~ he says, it is better to distinguish between those monads which 
have bare perceptions only, and those in which perception is 
more distinct, Which have feeling, and.whose peroeption is 
accompanied by memory. The former may better be called bare 
monads or entelechies, and the latter~.Souls.45 Souls, and 
a fortiori bare monads, by their very nature are never without 
perception. 46 However, these perceptions can be more or less 
distinct and striking, and the degree of this distinctness 
constitutes the various degrees of consciousness from sleeping 
to waking. 47 Accordingly, all our ideas are within us in germ, 
so to speak, and by the prooess of this oonstant internal 
ohange they beoome more and more distinot. That which disting-
uishes our rational souls from those of animals is that through 
this continual evolution of internal perception rational souls 
can come to the knowledge of necessary and' eternal truths, 
whereas an~als cannot arrive at suoh knowledge. 48 
44 ~., n. 15, 226. 
45 ~., n. 19, 230. 
46 Ibid., n. 21, 230-231. 
47 Ibid., nne 20-24, 230-231. 
48 Ibid., n. 29, 233. 
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There is one last aspect of this novel system whi~ we 
must especially note. Man, as is rather evident, is composed 
not only of rational soul but also of body. But the soul, as 
we saw, is incapable of being determined in any way from with-
out. All its activity is internal. HOw, then, can the knowled~ 
the soul gets through the senses by the agency of the body's 
sense organs be explained. The explanation is rather simple. 
God in establishing the universe so ordered all monads that 
they would each work in perfect harmony. Accordingly, when the 
bare monads of matter by their own internal change bring about 
sensible physical phenomena, the soul by its own internal 
changes concomitantly makes the corresponding changes, so that 
perceptions arise in the mind corresponding to, but not caused 
by, the external phenomena.'9 
With this as a general background, we are now in a position 
to examine what place can be found in that background for the 
doctrine of faculties. Stout claims50 that Leibnitz ought to 
receive as much credit for attacking innate faculties as Locke 
has received for attacking innate ideas. Yet it seems that 
Leibnitz does not entirely reject faculties. On the contrary 
his philosophy demands the two principle faculties of Perception 
49 Ibid., nne 52, 78, 246-247, 262. 
50 G.r. Stout, Analytic Psycbology, SWan Sonnenschein, London, 
1896, I, 18. 
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and APpetition. 51 It is true his idea of faculty, becdUse of 
his own peouliar philosophio system, is different from the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic notion, and this latter he does attaok. 
Nevertheless, the real objeot of his attack seems to be, as we 
shall see, rather a carioature of the faculties than that which 
is aotually proposed by St. Thomas. 
Leibnitz, of oourse, will have none of Lookets tabula rasa 
which receives its ideas through the medium of sensation and 
reflexion. The mind according to Leibnitz is not a blank 
something that receives its perceptions from without, but it 
contains within itself the germ of all its ideas. These ideas 
contained in germ within the soul come into consciousness 
through the oontinuous process of internal ohanges or "per-
ceptions." But, Leibnitz says, you may object and say that 
the "tabula" is not entirely "rasa" but has faculties by means 
of which it can contaot the reality without. 
You may perhaps reply that this tabula 
rasa of the philosophers means that the 
soul has by nature and originally only 
bare faoulties. But faculties without 
some act, in a word the pure powers of 
the sohool, are also only fictions, which 
nature knows not, and which are obtained 
only by the process of abstraotion. For 
where in the world will you ever find a 
faculty whioh shuts itself up in the 
power alone without performing any act? 
. , 
51 Leibnitz, n. 48, 244-245, also What Is Idea, New Essays trl. 
by Langley, Open Oourt, Ohicago, 1916, 716. 
There is alw~ys a partioular disposition .' 
to action, and to one action rather than 
to another. And besides the disposition 
there is a tendency to action, of which 
tendencies there is always an infinity 
in each subject at once; and these ten-
dencies are never Without some effect. 52 
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This quotation is an excellent epitome of the meaning of 
'faculty' in Leibnitz' monadological system. After first 
impugning the faculties of the Schoolmen, he brings out clearly 
that he does not consider the powers of the soul to be dependent 
on external stimuli for their activity; they are internal 
"dispositions" and "tendencies to action" which, moreover, are 
always in action for they are "never without some effect." A 
pure potency or power in the strict Aristotelian sense, he says, 
cannot exist, for there is no potency or power possible without 
its being here and now reduced to act. These powers are ten-
dencies which are always in the process of aot. "Real powers 
are never simple possibilities," says Leibnitz; "they have 
always tendenoy and aotion."53 Wallace explains this position 
of Leibnitz with regard to the faoulties very well: 
It is out of the variety, the oomplioation, 
and relations of these minature or little 
peroeptions and appetitions that the oon-
spiouous phenomena of consciousness are to 
be explained, and not by suppoaing them due 
to one or the other faculties. o4 
52 Leibnitz, trl. Langley, Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 2. 
53 ~., Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 10. 
54 Wallaoe, 58-59. 
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The powers of the soul, then, in Leibnitz' philoso~hy are 
internal dynamic evolutionary forces whicb produce conscious 
pbenomena wbolly within tbe mind. Henoe the soholastio conoept 
of a power as being only in part immanently aotive and in part 
passive, that is, requiring some determination from external 
phenomena, will not fit with his system. Aooordingly, to the 
scholastio diotum, "Nibil est in intellectu quod non prius 
fueri t in sensu," Leibnit z logioally adds, "Nisi ipse 
intellectus. If 55 
In view of his system, then, it is quite intelligible why 
Leibnitz should oonsider "faoulties without some act, in a word 
the pure powers of the school .•. only fictions, which nature 
knows not, and which are obtained only by the prooess of 
abstraction." If they were ~ than fiotions, a!! system 
would be a fiotion; if nature would oondesoend to "know them," 
his system would have to be one "wbicb nature knows not." 
Moreover, Leibnitz misses tbe mark rather badly wben he 
says that the faoulties are "obtained only by the process of 
abstraction." There is a great deal of difference between tbe 
process of abstraction and the process of deduotion. The 
prooess of abstraotion is that employed in the formation of 
55 Leibnitz, trl. Langley, Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 2. 
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universal concepts, and the faculties of St. Thomas de~nitely 
are not universal concepts. The process of deduction is that 
used in arriving at the nature of a cause by examining the 
nature of the effect. By examining the manifold of conscious-
ness, one deduces the necessity of a principle for such activity 
and thus arrives at the necessity of the soul as the ultimate 
principle, and of the faculties as the proximate principles of 
the phenomena of consciousness. 
It is true, however, that the faculties, considered from 
the viewpoint of Leibnitz' own philosophy, could perhaps be 
considered mere "abstractions," for in his system the 'faculty" 
(entelechy) is never without some "act" (perception). Hence 
the idea of a "faculty" alone without some "act" would be a 
sort of abstraction. In his strictures against the faculties, 
therefore, Leibnitz, by considering them merely abstractions. 
makes clear that he,as the Nominalists,does not recognize the 
validity of the realism of the Schools. The Thomistic Schoolmen 
would, therefore, reject his criticism, as it rejects that of 
any nominalistic position wbich denies a parte rei foundations 
j.. ;~ 
for generalizations arrived at by a process of reasoning. 
Leibnitz, then, out of loyalty to bis system was con-
strained to disagree with that which did not fit into it. Even 
if he had rightly understood (which is possible) the scholastic 
doctrine of the faculties, out of sheer consistency he would 
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have been forced to disagree With it. Yet it seems ver~ likely, 
as we shall show presently, that he did not understand the 
scholastic position, and, acoordingly, that when he attacked 
the faculties of the Schools, he attacked shadows; that he 
attacked not the scholastic doctrine but its caricature. 
In the prooess of discussing the proposition whether a 
purely material thing thinks or not, he says: 
To .speak in an entirely simple manner of 
giving or according powers is to return 
to the naked faoulties of the Scboolmen 
and to imagine minute self-subsisting 
entities which may go in and out like 
pigeons from a pigeon bouse. It is 
making substances of them Without being 
aware of it. o6 
Oertainly one who calls the faculties of tbe Schoolmen "minute 
self-subsisting entities which may go in and out like pigeons 
from a pigeon house," definitely does not understand their 
doctrine at all. For it is of the very essence of the School-
men's "naked faculties" that they are not self-subsisting, and 
that they cannot "go in and out like pigeons." The scholastio 
doctrine is emphatiC on this point, that the faculties are B2i 
independent either in nature ~ in operation. Moreover, they 
were never in any sense considered to be substances, but only 
accidents. 
It seems likely that such a distortion of the faculties was 
56 ~., Sk. IV, Oh. III, n. 6. 
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not malicious, but Was due partially at least to a misunder-
.' 
standing of what the Schoolmen, especially the Thomistic 
Schoolmen, really held. Leibnitz seemed at least to understand 
that notion of faculty which the Schoolmen actually held, but 
erroneously attributed to them a distortion of that theory. 
For in commenting on Lockets warning that by loose speeoh one 
can distort the true nature of the faoulties, Leibnitz remarks 
that he does not care to deoide the problem whether or not the 
faculties are real and distinct entities; and quite correctly 
adds that if they are, they certainly could not be considered 
as real agents, for it is not the faculties that act but the 
substance, by means of the faculties: 
The question has exercised the scholastics 
a long time whether there is a real distinct-
ion between the soul and its faculties, and 
whether one faoulty is really distinct from 
another ••. The Realists said yes, and the 
Nominalists, no, and the same question has 
been agitated as to the reality of many 
other abstract entities, which should meet 
the same fate. But I do not think we need 
here decide this question and plunge into 
these difficulties ••• However, if they 
were real and distinct entities, they can 
pass for real agents only in extravagant 
speech. It is not the faculties or 
qualities which act, but7substances by means of the faculties. 5 " 
If we exoept the remark about "abstract entities," the propriety 
of Which terminology we discussed above, there is very little 
exception that can be taken to such a statement. It gives 
57 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, n. 6. 
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evidence that Leibnitz both knew something of the probLem and 
something of the form the solution must take. Accordingly, 
the mistake he made in attacking the Schoolmen seems to be not 
so much a mistake of theory as a mistake of !!£i. He understood 
the theory sufficiently well, but he falsely accused the 
Scholastics of holding as their doctrine of the faculties such 
distortions as "self-subsisting entities which go in and out 
like pigeons from a pigeon house." To accuse the Schools of 
propounding such a doctrine is certainly to be unaoquainted 
with, and, oonsequently, to misrepresent the faots. 
With the section on Leibnitz we conclude this ohapter on 
the early modern philosophers. Suffice it to say, in conolud-
ing this chapter, that we have already noted some of the prin-
ciple objeotions against the faculties: that they are not 
realities, but merely names oonvenient for classifying mental 
phenomena; that they are self-subsisting beings; that they are 
beings independent or autonomous in their aotivity; that they 
are fiotions of the mind. That these objeotions cannot justly 
be alleged against the Thomistic faculties is a faot, the proof 
of which has been made sufficiently obvious, we hope, as not 
to require repetition here. 
.' 
OHAPTER IV 
FAOULTY OONOEPT FROM WOLFF TO HERBART 
'Faculty Psychology" received an entirely new impetus in 
the philosophy of Ohristian Wolff, Emmanuel Kant, and later by 
Gall and his phrenology. Following almost immediately upon 
this new impetus, came a theory diametrically opposed to that 
of the"so-called" faculties of the mind. This new theory was 
that of the Associationists, of which group Johann Herbart was 
the leader. It will be the purpose of this chapter to analyze 
these two counter positions and to evaluate each according to 
the Thomistic position. 
Wolff's findings, it seems, wer~ not new and in some 
respects they recapitulated the opinions of the earlier faculty 
psychologists. Perhaps more than anyone else, however, Wolff 
is responsible for calling explicit attention to a new trend 
that had been shOWing itself in the field of psychology. Psy-
chologists had been becoming more and more empirically minde~ 
and less concerned with the metaphysics of psychology. Recog-
nizing this growing distinction, Wolff divided the field into 
Rational and Empirical Psychology. The gap between these two 
diSCiplines became wider and wider in the ensuing years, so 
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that today the greater portion of psyohologioal endeavo; is no 
longer philosophic but soientific. We are here calling 
explicit attention to this important historic fact, for as we 
shall later see, this pronounced change of approach to the 
field of psychology has been the source of many attacks on the 
faculty theory. 
Kant, a disciple of Wolff who was destined to outshine by 
far his master, occupies a very important position in the 
history of "faculty psychology." So important is the place he 
occupies, that it is our reasoned opinion that later condemna-
tions of the faculty theory are directed largely, though, per-
haps, in many cases unconsciously, against his doctrine. 
Herbart, for example, whose work was considered at one time to 
be so devastating, that it was said he not only "killed" the 
faculties, but "cremated" them and scattered their ashes, 
mentions as the object of his attack not the faculties of the 
Schoolmen, but those of Wolff and Kant.l Our present concern, 
then, will be to inquire, with a degree of thoroughness pro-
portionate to its importance, into the psychology of Kant, and 
to determine as clearly as possible his theory of the faculties. 
When we read through the works of some of the earlier 
modern philosophers, we find with difficulty any use of the 
1 Johann F. Herbart, A Text-Book in PS~ChOlOgf' trl. by Kargaret 
K. Smith, Appleton, New York, 1891, (note. 
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term "faoulty." Suoh is oertainly not the oase with ragard to 
the works of Kant. Mention of the various faoulties is very 
frequent in his pages. In order to understand them properly, 
bowever, it will be neoessary to see them in their setting. In 
other words it will be necessary to get a general idea of 
Kant's theory of knowledge. 
All knowledge, says Kant, has its souroe in sense im-
pressions. The manifold of sense impressions beoome intuitions 
only when invested with the a priori forms of time and space. 
Sense intuition, then, is the manifold of sensation organized 
or synthesized by the forms of time and space. 2 
However, the manifold of sense impressions synthesized by 
the forms of time and space into sense intuitions are not as 
yet intellectual knowledge. They must first pass into the 
a priori forms of the cognoscitive faoulties, and must be s~ 
thesized by the oategories of the understanding into conscious 
intelleotual knowledge, muoh in the same way that sense im-
pressions are synthesized into intuitions by being invested 
with the forms of time and spaoe. Oonsoious knowledge, th~~, 
is formed, oonstituted, synthesized by the oategories. The 
2 "Space and time are the pure forms of our intuition, while 
sensation forms its matter. Whatever our sensation may be, 
these forms are necessarily inherent in it, while sensations 
themselves may be of the most different character." 
Immanuel Kant, Oritique of Pure Reason, trl. by Max Muller, 
Maomillan, Bew York, 1927, 34=35. 
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categories are the universal, necessary, a priori formL .. of 
thought. They oonstitute the intelleotual element of knowledge. 
They reoeive the sense intuitions through the mediation of the 
blind faoulty of imagination,3 and invest them With one of the 
twelve universal a priori forms oalled categories. All this 
process of tinvestiture' is anterior to oonsoiousness. Sense 
intuitions become oonsoious knowledge only after having been 
invested with the forms of the categories. Such is the process 
involved in the syntheSiS of thought.' 
The evolution of thought, then, begins with the collection 
of sense phenomena into the manifold of sense impressions, 
which, sifted into and unified by the a priori forms of time 
space, constitute sense intuitions. These intuitions in turn 
are further unified by the imaginationS and sifted into the 
3 Ibid., 64, also 101-102. 
4 'The spontaneity of our thought requires that what is manifold 
in the pure intuition should first be in a certain way exam-
ined, received, and connected, o:>y the oategories] in order 
to produce (underlining mincU a knowledge of it. This act I 
call Synthesis. • •• Knowledge is first produced by the s~ 
thesis of what is manifold ••• We shall see hereafter that 
synthesiS in general is the mere result of what I call the 
faculty of imagination ••• But to reduce this syntheSiS to 
concepts is a function that belongs to the understanding 
(jri th its categories], and by Which the understanding 
supplies us for the first time with knowledge properly so 
called." Ibid., 64-65. 
5 Ibid., 64-65, also 101-102. 
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categories, whioh are the constitutive prinoiples of conscious 
knowledge. 6 
However, the unity of constituted knowledge is not enough. 
There must be a further unifying of the acts of knowledge into 
the forms of reasoning or ratiocination. Man is not only a 
judging animal; he is also a reasoning, syllogizing, ration-
alizing animal. Hence the knowledge already constituted by the 
oategories is now regulated by the three transoendental forms 
a priori of the faculty of reason called Ideas. 7 
This unifying of the thought material of the categories by 
the a priori regulative8 forms, oalled Ideas, constitutes the 
final step used by the mind in the synthesis and unification of 
its produot--thought. Suoh a process reminds us strongly of 
the functioning of a factory where t~e raw materials are poured 
in at one end, and the finished product drops out at the other. 
6 "The first that must be given us a priori for the sake of know-
ledge of all objects, is the manifold in pure intuition. The 
second is the synthesis of the manifold by means of imagina-
tion. But this does not yet produoe true knowledge. The oon-
oepts [categorie~ which impart unity to this pure synthesis 
and oonsist entirely in the representation of this necess~~y 
synthetioal unity, add the third oontribution towards the' 
knowledge of an object, and rest on the understanding." 
Ibid., 65. 
7 "Ideas, however, are still further removed from objective 
reality than the categories, ••• They oontain a oertain 
completeness unattainable by any possible empirical knowledge, 
and reason aims in them at a systematical unity only, ••• " 
Ibid., 459. 
8 Kant, Oritique of Aesthetic Judgment, trl. by J.O. Meredith, 
Olarendon, Oxford, 1911, Preface to First Edition, 3. 
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We have traoed in brief the prooess of oognosoitiv, 
operation. Now we must investigate the individual factors that 
are responsible for this process. In other words we must deter-
mine the number, classification, nature, and function of Kant's 
faculties of the soul. 
first we shall consider the number and classifioation of 
the faculties. 
for all the faoulties of the soul, or 
oapacities, are reducible to three, whioh 
do not admit of any further deviation from 
a common ground: the faculty of knoWledge, 
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and 
the faoUlty of desire. 9 
The faoulty of knowledge, however, is not single. It i. 
composed of the cognoscitive faculties of understanding, judg-
ment, and reason. Speaking of his Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant remarks: 
Hence it makes our cognoscitiv8 faoulties 
its sole concern, to the exclusion of the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure and the 
faoulty of desire; and among the oognoscitive 
faoulties it confines its attention to 
understanding and its a priori prinoiples, 10 
to the exclusion of judgment and reason, ••• 
Within the faculty of understanding, moreover, we have'the 
twelve a priori constitutive forms or concepts oalled 
categories. l1 Within the faculty of reason are found the three 
9 ~., Introduction, 15-16. 
10 ~., Preface to first Edition, 3. 
11 Kant, (Muller), 66. 
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regulative prinoiples oalled Ideas. Besides these, Ka~~ enum-
erates the faoulty of lmagination.12 
The faoulties thus far explicitly enumerated have been on 
the intellectual level. On the sense level there is the 
"faoulty of reoeiving representations ••• called sensibility.H13 
This faculty of sensibility in turn contains the "two pure 
forms of sensuous intuition, namely, Spaoe and Time."14 
With all this evidenoe of a diversity of faoulties, we 
oertainly oan consider Kant's psyohology a "faoulty psyohology." 
OUr next problem after having enumerated the various 
faoulties (and this enumeration professes to be substantially 
but not absolutely oomplete) is to investigate the nature of 
the faoulties and their a priori forms. 
Are the faculties and their forms inherent qualities of 
the soul, by reason of which the soul can act? Are they the 
powers the soul possesses, by reason of which it is capable of 
produoing its own aots? Or are they conceived of as independent 
and autonomous parts of the soul, or as oontainers, so to sp~ak, 
into whioh phenomenal content is poured, so as to take the 
shape or form of sensation or thought as the oase may be. 
12 Ibid., 64-85, also 101-102. 
13 Ibid., 15. 
14 Ibid., 17. 
These latter two conceptions of the faculties seem to oome 
closest to the doctrine of Kant. 
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Turner, for example, speaks of the categories as "empty 
forms of intellectual knowledge, all the oontents of intelleotua. 
knowledge being derived from experience."15 Again, "the cate-
gories without representative or other empirical content are 
empty.B16 Henderson makes the following remarks concerning 
Kantian faoulties: 
Aocording to the notion of the faculties, 
the sorts of consciousness are the results 
of the manipulation by these inner powera 
of the material given by the senees ••• 
They merely arrange the materials of sense 
in a different manner; manufacture it, as 
it were, into new forma. l ? 
The views thus expressed are easily substantiated by quo-
tations from the works of Kant himself. Speaking of empirioal 
sense intuitions, he says: DSpaoe and time are pure forms of 
our intuition while sensation forms its matter. nlS Again in 
his discussion of the categories we find the following state-
ment: 
Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has 
before it the manifold contents of sensibil-
ity a priori, supplied by transcendental 
15 Turner, History of PhilosophY, Ginn, New York, 1929, 534. 
16 ~., 535. 
17 I.N. Henderson, A Text-Book in the Principles of Education, 
Kacmillan, New York, 1924, 290. 
lS Kant (Muller), 34. 
aesthetic as the material for the ooncepts 
[oategorieaI of the pure understanding, 
without whioh those oonoepts would be with-19 out any oontents, therefore entirely empty. 
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Hote especially the words, "without which (manifold oontents of 
sensibility a priori) those concepts (oategories) would be with-
out any oontents, therefore entirely empty. ,. 
Dr. Paul Oarus, in an essay on Kant's philosophy oompares 
Kant's faoulties and forms to mental pigeon-holes: 
The difference between the oabinet with 
pigeon-holes and the human mind is this, 
that the former is artifioial, the latter 
natural. The human mind with its ration-
ality has been developed aooording to 
meohanical law and the olassifioation of 
sense impressions is done by it as auto-
matioally as the distribution of the dif-
ferent loaters in a type distributing 
maohine. a 
If the faoulties with their forms are, aooording to their 
nature, distinot oompartment-like beings, one might expect that 
in their operation they should be equally distinot, and there-
fore, in their funotions independent of eaoh other or autonomous. 
And suoh is precisely what Kant held: prinoiples autonomous and 
independent in their operations. Speaking of the faoulties of 
understanding and of reason, he says: 
Both faoulties, therefore, besides their 
applioation in point of logioal form to 
prinoiples of Whatever origin, have, in 
19 ~., 63-64. 
20 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, edit. in English by P. Oarus, 
Open Oourt, Ohioago, 1933, 220. 
addition, their own peouliar jurisdiotion .' 
in the matter of their oontent, and so, 
there being no further a priori jurisdiotion 
above them, the division of Philosophy i~to 
theoretioal and praotioal is justified.a1 (Sublineations not in original) 
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Eaoh of these two faoulties then have "their own peouliar juris-
diotion" and, moreover, have "no further jurisdiotion above 
them." In another plaoe Kant speaks of the higher faoulties 
"as faoulties oontaining an autonomy.uaa Olearly, this is a 
far ory from the Thomistio dootrine of the faoulties, aooording 
to whioh the faoulties are by essenoe dependent on the soul, 
whioh alone is !a! effioient prinoiple. 
As a result of this investigation of the nature and 
funotion of the Kantian faoulties, we have found that they are 
independent in existenoe and autonomous in operation. Suoh a 
oonolusion would naturally give rise·to the question, "Whenoe 
the unity of oonsoiousness that we aotually experienoe?" "How 
does Kant aohieve unity in the mind?" 
Kant does aohieve a unity in the mind, but it is the unity 
of integral parts in a oomposite whole, and not the substantial 
unity of the soul aooording to the Thomistio dootrine. Meredith 
in an essay on the Oritique of Judgment speaks of the "mind as a 
al Kant (Meredith), Introduotion, 15. 
22 Ibid., Introduction, 38. 
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system with various speoial faoulties, all oombining harmon-
iously in a teleologioal unity." Then quoting Kant, he says: 
••• reason is, in regard to the principles 
of cognition, a perfeotll distinct, 
independent unitz, in Which, as in an 
organized body, every member exists for 
the sake of the others, and all for the 
sake of each, so that no prinoiple can 
be viewed, with safety, in one relation-
ship, unless it is, at the same time, 
viewed in re~ttion to the total use of 
pure reason. {Sublineation not in original) 
At this point it is proper to give ear to a reasonable 
objection that may be raised against the form that this brief 
Kantian analysis has taken. To speak of Kantian faculties as 
moulds or forms into whioh thought is "sifted" or 'poured," 
it may be objected, is graphic but is hardly representative of 
Kant's real meaning. To speak of the faculties as we have done 
is to oonsider them as noumena, whereas Kant never reaohes the 
noumena; his critique remains wholly in the phenomena. One 
cannot properly speak of Kantian faculties as aotually existing 
as this present analysis would lead one to assume. For Kant 
the soul and its faoulties were no more actually existent than 
the external world of sense. The a priori forms are rather'~ 
simple ways or forms acoording to which the mind by its very 
nature must think, much as Scholastic philosophers would say 
23 Emanuel Kant, Oritique of pure Reason, trl. by J.M.D. Meikle-john, Bell & Sons, 1930, London, Preface to Second Edition, 
xxxii, cf. Kant (Meredith) pg xix. 
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that whenever our minds think, they always must think according 
to, or be regulated by, first principles. 
Nevertheless, in spite of this objection, it seems safe to 
state that Kant's manner of speaking has left his writings open 
to the interpretation here given, and has made it possible for 
subsequent psychologists to conoeive of the notion of "faculty" 
as a sort of "mould" or "form," or even "pigeon-hole," and for 
that very reason, has made it possible for them to reject it. 
Oonsequently, we are now in something of a position to 
form a rather important conclusion with regard to the Kantian 
faculty psychology. Subsequent to Kant author after author has 
used all sorts of abusive language against the faculties. "The 
mind was not unlike a series of pigeon-holes, or heremetically 
sealed compartments."24 " ••• composi~e of abstract energies.·25 
" ••• bundle of detached powers, somehow standing side by 
side ••• "26 HThe faculty theory bids us search for the energy 
of the mind •.• in the manipulating power of certain abstraot 
agencies, ••• H27 "The mind is regarded as a machine of which the 
different faculties are parts."28 " ••• the mind is a storag~ 
24 L.A. Averill, Elements of Educational Psychology, Houghton-
Mifflin, New York, 1924, 351. 
25 Ibid., 351. 
26 James Sully, Outlines of Psyohology, Appleton, New York, 1885, 
26. 
27 Henderson, 285. 
28 E.L. Thorndike, The Principles of Teaching, Seiler, New York, 
1921. 236. 
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battery whioh oan be loaded with will power or intelleoc or 
jUdgment ••• R29 • ••• bank to be drawn on at leiBure. H30 • •.• fab-
ulous entities whioh worked out the destinies of the indivi-
dual. H31 True, most of these aoousations oome from educational 
psyohologists, who are oonfronted with the problem of training 
the mind, a problem slightly different from that of the pure 
psyohologist. Nevertheless, if there i8 any basis for their 
aoousations in the purely psyohologioal doctrine of the faoul-
ties, it oertainly would not be in the faculty psychology of 
St. Thomas. Justifioations for such aoousations aooording to 
our opinion oould be found only in one or both of two plaoes; 
that is, either in the loose and oareless terminology of an 
orthodox Thomistic faoulty psyohologist, or in the oarioatures 
of orthodox faoulty psyohology suoh as that suggested in the 
philosophy of Xant. As we saw, his faoulties and a priori 
forms may be considered as "oompartments," "detaohed powers," 
integral "parts," forms to be filled, etc. It i8 just such 
oonoepts that have given the handle to many of our modern psy-
ohologists, eduoational or otherwise, for muoh of the vitupera-
tion or dignified disdain meted out to "faoulty psychology.', 
29 Ibid., 237. 
30 ~., 237. 
31 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning Process, Maomillan, New York, 1922, 
212. 
63 
The history of the faoulty theory reaohes an impor~ant 
phase in the philosophy of Johann Freidrioh Herbart, Kant's 
suooessor at Koenigsburg. Herbart's utter rejeot10n of faoul-
ties and faoulty psyohology was the first great impetus towards 
the modern "overthrow" of the faculty theory. The transition 
from Kantian Idealism to the Assooiationism of Herbart lies in 
the similarity with whioh the oontent or raW material of con-
soiousness in both rival systems somehow slips in lunawares'. 
For Kant this unoonsoious oontent is rendered conscious through 
the nmanipulation" of the a priori forms. Herbart will have 
none of this inner manipulation of faoulties. For him the un-
apprehended content material is lifted into the realm of con-
sciousness by "the foroe of other kindred ideas that are already 
in this realm. n32 New ideas are lifted into consoiousness be-
oause of their relation with old ones. 
It may possibly be legitimate to oonsider suoh a ohange in 
dootrine a transition, but it would seem more acourate to oall 
it a oleavage, a hiatus, or a complete break; for a fathomless 
philosophioal abyss separates the two positions. Kant still 
clung to the notion of a soul. For Herbart the soul was at'best 
meaningless and virtually non-existent. 
The Simple nature of the soul is totally 
unknown and will forever remain so. It 
is as little an objeot 0i3speoulative as 
of empirioal psyohology. 
32 Henderson, 290-291. 
33 Herbart. 120. 
64 
If the mind, then, is utterly superfluous insofar as the 
production of ideas is concerned, it is not hard to conceive 
what place is reserved for the mind's faculties. Bode rightly 
saw the immediate illation when he remarked, "The repudiation 
of the substantive mind involves, as its implication, abandon-
ment of the belief in faculty psychology and formal discipline.~ 
However, it is not necessary to rely merely on an illation to 
arrive at Herbart's position on faoulties. He is quite explicit 
in their condemnation. 
The soul has no innate natural talents nor 
faoulties whatever, either for the purpose 
of receiving or for the purpose of produo-
ing. It is, therefore, no tabula rasa in 
the sense that impressions foreign to it-
self may be made upon it; moreover, in the 
sense indioated by Leibnitz, it is not a 
substance which includes in itself original 
activity. It bas originally neither oon-
cepts, nor feelings, nor desires. It knows 
nothing of itself, and nothing of other 
things; also in it lie no forms of percep-
tion and thought, no laws of willing and 
action, and not i~en a remote predisposition 
to any of these. 
We are not surprised then when we find that Herbart is uni-
versally held up as an implaoable enemy of "Faculty psychology." 
Author after author makes the remark that with Herbart, faculty 
psychology met with a deadly foe. 
34 B.H. Bode, Oonf1icting Psychologies of Learning, Heath, 
Ohicago, 1929, 88. 
~5 Herbart, 120. 
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It is not our purpose here to enter upon a refutation of 
Associationism. It is sufficient to note that the nature of 
the doctrine essentially excludes anything like faculties of 
the soul. Moreover, it is clear, that in order to establish 
his position, Herbart was forced to wage war on the doctrine 
of faculties. Yet to get a clear picture of this situation it 
is essential to note against whose doctrine of faculties his 
guns were leveled. Was it against the faculties of St. Thomas? 
Herbart himself tells us against whom his artillery was 
directed. 
It may be briefly stated here, but not shown 
in detail, that in modern times psyohology 
has rather gone backWard than forward. In 
regard to this science, Locke and Leibnitz 
were both upon a better path than that along 
which we have been led by Wolff and Kant. 
The two latter advooate in a peculiar manner 
the discrimination of mental faculties, and 
for this reason must be olassed together, 
however much they differ from each other in 
other respeots. Wolff had in mind the 
logical task of classifying mental phenomena, 
without troubling himself more closely with 
their inner origination, and for this reason 
he is unequaled in the thOughtlessness with 
which he covers up the greatest difficulties 
with mere verbal definitions. Kant makes use 
of the hypothetical mental faculties to pre-
sent his investigation clearly according to ., 
form, that he might accompany human knowledge 
in its progress from the senses to the under-
standing and the reason, and it is not easy 
to rid his writings of this hryothesis. 36 (Sublineations not in original 
36 Berbart, 7, (Note). 
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Oertainly no one would hold up Wolff and much 1es&,Kant as 
authors of the best expression of Thomistic faculty psychology. 
As a matter of fact, it would be hard for Herbart to rival the 
invective that a Thomistic faculty psychologist would level at 
Kantian faculties. Therefore since the criticism of Herbart 
is not primarily directed against the theory as propounded by 
St. Thomas, a refutation of his criticism here would seem to be 
superfluous. However, for sake of completeness, and since any 
attack on faculties reductive1y affects the Thomistic theory, 
we will add Professor Spearman's devastating comment on the 
Associationism of Herbart. 
Herewith we reach the very antithesis of the 
doctrine of faculties; every different mental 
process now stands for itself; we pass from 
the Do1igarchic" doctrine of a few reigning 
prinCiples to the "anarchylf of a disordered 
multitude of particular cases ••• Drop this 
[some sort of generalization of mental act-
ivity either by 'faculties', or "substantially 
the same doctrine under other names"] and the 
scope of all knowledge is reduced to that of 
particular cases. Generalities disappear; 
and therewith, soience. The whole of the 
psychology fabricated after this fashion 
comes olattering down like a house built up 
of cards. 37 
At about the time Herbart was writing his Lebrbuch zurPsy-
ohologie (1816), which contained his utter rejection of the 
faoulties, a novel soheme of faoulty psyohology was being de-
vised by Gall and his pupil Spurzheim in their work Anatomie et 
37 O. Spearman, Psyoho1ogy Down the Ages, Maomillan, London, 19 
I, 191-192. 
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" Physiologie du Systeme Nerveux (1810). A good desoript1~n of 
this bizarre system of faoulties is given us by Bode. 
The dootrine of phrenology is of interest 
here beoause it represents a oombination 
of faoulty psyohology and physiology .•. The 
suggestion advanoed by the phrenologists was 
that the different faoulties of the mind had 
their "seat" in oertain speoifio parts of the 
brain, and that if a given trait or faoulty 
was highly developed, this faot would show 
itself in the prominenoes or the "bumps" of 
the skull •.• In order to make this soheme 
work, the whole set of faoulties was largely 
made over. Instead of determining the 
faoulties of the mind by such abstraot 
qualities as reasoning, imagining, per-
oeiving, eto., the phrenologists studied 
individuals for the purpose of noting out-
standing traits of behavior, such as 
amativeness, pugnaoity, oonsoientiousness, 
and the like. These traits were olassed as 
faoulties, and the attempt was made to 
oorrelate th!W With the oonfigurations of 
the skull ••• 
Although almost entirely physiologioal, the dootrine was, 
nevertheless, oonsidered to be a variant of "faoulty psy-
ohology." Sinoe later it degenerated into a speoies of parlor 
game amusement, it helped to plunge Faoulty Psyohology deeper 
into the disrepute into whioh it had fallen. Oonsequently when 
we find an author oalling into question the existenoe of 
faoulties because there "is no such thing as a oenter for 
memory" sinoe "the faots indioate that the various aots of 
remembering involve all sorts of 'oenters
'
,"39 we oome to see 
38 Bode, 51-52. 
39 Ibid., 52. 
-
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more clearly how such an attack on the "faculties" can uve no 
reference whatever to the metaphysical faculties of St. Thomas. 
There is an important fact, which though obvious, is of 
sufficient importance to deserve explicit attention here; 
namely, that the term "Faculty Psychology" is anything but uni-
vocal. Anyone who should, in studying Gall's or Kant's 
"tectonic" faculties, feel that he has reached a full under-
standing of "faculty psychology," would be similar to the stu-
dent of political science who felt that he was fully conversant 
with the theory of Democracy after making an intense study of 
'democraoy' as found in the U.S.S.R. The variants of "faculty 
psychology" are so divergent as hardly to deserve the same 
generio term. Oonsequently, an attack against one kind of 
faculty psychology could hardly be oonsidered as justified 
against any or every other variation. Surely an attaok against 
the physiologioal theory of phrenology would be most unjustly 
urged against the metaphysioal theory of Thomistio faoulty 
psyohology. 
.' 
OHAPTER V 
LATER ORITIOISMS 
The vast amount of psychological literature that has been 
published since the beginning of the nineteenth century has 
contained a large number of varied criticisms of the faculties 
and faculty psychology. And yet strangely enough many of the 
avowed enemies of the faculties have given surprising evidenoe 
of inoonsistenoy, and have athemselves very often introduoed 
what are essentially faoulties ••• although usually other terms 
are employed, such as 'abilities', 'oapaoities', 'instinots', 
and 'temperaments· ••• al Nevertheless the faot remains that the 
attacks have been many and varied. Throughout them all, how-
ever, there runs a remarkable similarity, and despite the 
acoidental differences resulting from the varied approaohes and 
oontexts in whioh the attacks have been made, nearly all oan be 
reduoed to three or four types or forms. 
There are, first of all, those who oritioize the faoul~~es 
as independent agents distinct in being, and autonomous in 
operation. The second large division of objectors centers its 
1 O. Spearman, Psychologl Down the Ages, Maomillan, London, 
1937, I, 185-186. 
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attaok on this point, that whereas the faculties are poftulated 
in order to serve as an explanation of mental phenomena, they 
offer, as a matter of fact, no explanation whatever. At best, 
so it is claimed, they are but helpful concepts for classifying 
the varying phenomena of conSCiousness, which phenomena, even 
after such classification, remains wholly unexplained. 
The third score brought against the faculties is that they 
destroy the unity of the mind. This is a serious objeotion and 
one that deserves a careful answer. The fourth and last major 
type of objection is that the classification of mental phenomena 
under the head of faculties has been a stumbling block in the 
way of progress in psychology. For instead of stimulating 
further investigation into the process of conscious aotivity, 
it has, by assigning each process to the activity of a special 
faculty, closed the door with a certain air of finality to any 
further research. For those who understand something of the 
Thomistic concept of faculty, this seems to be the only object-
ion that carries any weight at all. And yet it is purely an 
extrinsic argument, not in the least affecting the validity of 
the theory. However, even here a careful distinotion will 
clear away muOh of the difficulty for an unprejudioed thinker. 
OBJEOTION I FAOULTIES OONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT AGENTS. 
As it will be reoalled, Leibnitz berated the faoulties for 
being "minute self-subsisting entities which may go in and out 
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like pigeons from a pigeon house." Sully olaims that !~oulty 
psyohology "bad led to the false supposit1on that mental aot1v-
ity, instead of be1ng one and the same throughout its manifold 
phases is a juxtaposition of totally distinot aotivities answer-
ing to a bundle of detaohed powers, somehow standing side by 
side, and exerting no influence on one another. uS Wundt, one of 
the most prominent of the modern psyohologists, has a similar 
ax to grind. 
It is in the dootrine of feeling and will 
more than anywhere else that psyohology 
still wears the pattern of the old faoulty 
theory. And so it has usually taken a 
radioally false view of these intimately 
oonneoted prooesses, regarding eaoh 
oonstituent as an independently existing 
whole, which might incidentally, but need 
not necessarily, exert an influence upon 
the constituents of the other ••• We must 
pronounoe this theory a purely imaginary 
oonstruotion from beginning to end. 3 
Again there are authors making remarks like these: "the 
mind is regarded as a machine of whioh the different faoulties 
are parts";4 "The mind was not unlike a series of pigeon-holes, 
or heremetioally sealed oompartments";5 " ••• fabulous entities 
2 James Sully, Outlines of Psyohology, Appleton, New York, ~885, 
26. 
3 W. Wundt, Human and Animal Behavior, pp. 224 sqq., referred to 
in The Psyohology of Intelligenoe and Will, by H.G. Wyatt, 
Harcourt, New York, 1931, 201-202. 
4 E.L. Thorndike, The Principles of Teaching, Seiler, New York, 
1921, 236. 
5 L.A. Averill, Elements of Eduoational Psychology, Houghton 
Mifflin, New York, 1924, 351. 
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v which worked out the destinies of the individual."6 
.' 
How it may be asked: What possible justification can be 
found for accusations of such a nature? Surely anyone who is 
in the least acquainted with the Thomistic concept of faculty 
will see that they are manifestly unjust. And yet they are not 
nearly so unjust as they seem. It must be remembered that the 
term nfaculty" and "faculty psychology" have been made to apply 
as well to Kantian faculties and other concepts of faculties as 
to those of the Schoolmen. How Kantian faculties, as has been 
seen, take on the appearance of being just what these aocusa-
tions accuse them of being. They appear to be independent, 
autonomous oompartments of the soul that manipulate the content 
presented by sensation; and manufacture, so to speak, the 
finished thought processes. Ho one oan condemn a critio too 
severely for accusing a thing for being what it appears to be. 
Another partial justification for such accusations is the 
unguarded use of words by the very ones who profess to uphold 
the true concept of faculty. Thus we find a former President 
of Saint Louis University, The Reverend A.J. Burrowes, S.J., in 
, " 
a monograph entitled, "Why Study Latin and Greek" making the 
following statement: "the human mind is a complicated bit of 
mechanism, requiring the highest skill of the educator to adjust 
6 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning Prooess, Macmillan, New York, 1922, 
212. 
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its parts. a7 Obviously he is speaking metaphorically .• ,Never-
theless, although not a professional psychologist, yet as a 
man "long prominent in Jesuit educational circles" he should be 
eXpected by reason of his prestige to be scientific enough in 
his phraseology as not to use the sort of language, Which in 
the words of Locke, has "produced great confusion." 
The last explanation for the type of aocusations at pre-
sent under consideration, lies in an imperfect understanding of 
the doctrine of St. Thomas himself. To be sure, St. Thomas does 
claim for the various faculties, real and distinot existence. 
Hence they are real and distinct entities. But to say that a 
being is real and distinct is not at all the equivalent of say-
ing that it is a being independent in existence and operation. 
• Substances' and 'aocidents' are both real existent beings, but 
a 'substance' in its own order is an'independentll existing 
being, whereas the 'acoident' is not. Now the faculties, acoord-
ing to the position of St. Thomas, are 'accidents', real beings, 
to be sure,and distinct from the sUbstanoe which is the soul, 
but bl no means independent of the soul either in their exist-
ence or in their operation. In like manner, the faculties ae-
mand for their operation the activity of the soul. They are, 
7 A.J. Burrowes, S.J., Why Study Latin and Greek, Milwaukee, 
1901, 5-6, found in YcGucken, The Jesuits and Education, 
Bruce, Milwaukee, 1932, 162. 
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as it were, channels or instrumental causes for the ac~vity of 
the soul. So completely are they dependent on the activity of 
the soul for their operation, that if and when that activity 
ceases, the operation of the faoulties neoessarily ceases. 
is the soul that acts through or by means of the faculties. 
SOiendum, quod potentia nihil aliud est 
quam principium operationis alicujus, 
sive sit actio sive passio; non quidem 
principium quod est subjeotum agens aut 
patiens;sed id quo agens agit, aut 
patiens p~~itur; sicut ars aedifioativa 
est potentia in aedificatore, qui per eam 
aedificat.8 
It 
-
Such a conoept of faoulty as here outlined is certainly far 
removed from "minute self-subsisting entities whioh go in and 
out like pigeons from a pigeon house." 
OBJEOTION II FAOULTIES ARE HELPFUL FOR OLASSIFYING THE 
PHENOMENA OF OONSOIOUSNESS, BUT OFFER NO 
EXPLANATION OF IT. 
This, perhaps, bas been the most popular of all objeotions 
offered by psychologists opposed to faculty psyohology. The 
objeotion, variously worded by the different authors, comes to 
this: the faculties are not realities but men~al oonstructs~~ 
useful perhaps for the purpose of olassifying conscious aots, 
but unfortunately personified or hypostatized, and wrongly pre-
sented as an explanation of the varied acts of consciousness. 
8 St. Thomas Aquinas, QuAe§tiones Disputatae et ~uaestiones 
Duadecim Quodlibetales, arietti, faurini-Romae, 1931, Vol. II. Art. XII. De Anima. ' 
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The following excerpt from Dessoir is a rather clear expression 
.' 
of this position: 
It may indeed be of advantage, for purposes of 
exposition, to bring similar phenomena under 
a generic concept, but such a concept must not 
be inflated to a mythological force or entity. 
Strictly speaking, each faaUity means simply 
a repetition of the faot whose nature one 
wishes to explain, with the addition of the 
word "power" or " faculty. "9 
Wundt likewise places the same objectiqn: 
The attempt to present a discriminating 
desoription of the different psychical 
processes, gave rise to the need of an 
appropriate classification. Olass-concepts 
were formed, under whioh the various pro-
cesses were grouped; and the attempt was 
made to satisfy the need of an inter-
pretation in each partioular case, by 
subsuming the oomponents of a given oom-
pound process under their proper class-
oonoepts. Such conoepts are, for example, 
sensation, knowledge, attention, memory, 
imagination, understanding, and ~ill •••. 
these derived psychioal conoepts may serve 
for a first grouping of the facts, but 
they contribute nothi~ whatever to the 
explanation of these acts. Still, 
empirical psychology has often been guilty 
of confounding this description with ex-
planation. Thus, the faoulty-pSYChOlogs considered these class-concepts as psyc ical 
forces or faculties, and referred psychical 
processes to their alternating or united 
activity.lO 
tI 
Vaihinger, however, wins the prize in his outline of ~he 
objection; for besides giving a very clear statement of the 
9 M. Dessoir, Outlines of the History of Psychology, Macmillan, 
lew York, 1912, 170. 
10 W. Wundt, Outlines of PsychOlogl, trl. by O.H. Judd, 
Engelmann, Leipzig, 1897, 11. 
objeotion itself, he adds a suffioient amount of ridicule to 
make the statement interesting. 
A whole series of well-known concepts, such 
as "soul," "force," and the various "psychical 
faoul ties, II etc., belong here. Al though these 
conceptual constructs were formerly, and are 
still today regarded as expressions for real 
and existing entities, they are, in truth, 
nothing but summational expressions for a 
series of interconnected phenomena and inter-
connected processes •••• Bo more is stated in 
these nominal fictions than what the single 
phenomena could tell us themselves, and if 
we believe that we bave understood or 
actually said anything in using these words--
a naive view that still surviv8s--we are 
simply forgetting that these expressions are 
purely tautological. l1 
.' 
When thes8 and similar attacks are analyzed closely, it 
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is found that they really contain three separate objeotions: 
first, that regardless what the faculties are olaimed to be, 
they are in reality nothing but general ooncepts convenient for 
the purpose of classification; second; that unfortunately they 
have been hypostatized into real agents; and third, that, in 
any oase, they offer no explanation of the psychio processes. 
That the faculties are merely class conoepts is the 
position long ago assumed by the Nominalists. Hamilton, in 
trying to defend faculties against those who would call the 
faculties a series of "mannikins," declared that the faculties 
were "nothing more than names determined by various orders of 
11 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If', tr1. by O.K. Ogden, 
Harcourt, New York, 1925, 212. 
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mental phenomena. RIB Now if the faoulties are merely ~mes, 
the obvious oonolusion is that the aotivity of the psyche is 
merely called intellectual when it thinks, volitional when it 
wills, memory when it remembers; but that in reality there is 
no such thing as an intelleot, a will, a memory, and so on. 
St. Thomas explioitly refutes this view, and shows that the 
faoulties are B21 of the essenoe of the soul, as this objection 
logioally demands that they be. 
Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt, 
potentias animae non esse aliud quam ipsam 
ejus essentiam; ita quod una et eadem assentia 
animae seoundum quod est prinoipium sensitivae 
operationis, dioitur sensus; secundum vero quod 
est intellectualis operationis princ ipium , 
dioitur intelleotus; et sio de aliis ••.• Sed 
haec positio est omnino impossibilis.13 
The reason why St. Thomas rejeots this position, has already 
been indioated in Ohapter II, pp. 8-11. 
The seoond part of the objection is direoted against the 
'fact' that these mere olassifioatory ooncepts have been hypo-
statized into real agents. In answer to this, it is necessary, 
in the light of what has just been said, to deny the 
'suppositum'j namely, that the faoulties are "mere olassifioa-
tory oonoepts." Sinoe the faoulties are not mere olassifioatory 
ooncepts but real existenoes, albeit essentially dependent on 
12 Sir William Hamilton, Leotures on Metaphysios and Logio, 
Gould & Lincoln, Boston, 1868, I, 269. 
13 AqUinas, Vol. II, De Spiritualibus Oreaturis, Art. XI. 
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the soul's sUbstanoe for existenoe , it is not neoessary., to 
hypostatize them; they already exist. As for their being hypo-
statized into real agents, it is neoessary but toreoall that 
St. Thomas definitely did not oonsider the faoulties as real 
agents, if by real agents is meant things possessing the power 
of independent aotion. If they oan be oalled agents at all, 
and they oan, it is only in an analogous sense, such as the 
agenoy of an instrument in the hands of an artist, the latter 
being the prinoipal agent. 14 
The third element of the oritioism is that the faoulties 
offer no explanation of oonsoious prooesses. 
To say that an individual mind possesses a 
oertain faoulty is merely to say that it 
is oapable of oertain states or prooesses. 
To assign the faoulty as a oause, or as a 
real condition of the states or prooesses, 
is evidently to explain in,a cirole, or in 
other wo~ds it is a mere failure to explain 
at all. 1 t> 
In answer to this objeotion, a distinotion is neoessary. 
That the theory of faoulties does not give a quantative or 
qualitive analysis of the processes of conSCiousness, oan be 
conoeded. That the theory of faculties offers no philosophtcal 
or metaphysical explanation of the ultimate source of conscious 
14 Ofr. Aquinas, De Anima, Art. XII, also r.x. Oalcagno, S.J., 
Philo sophia Soholastica, K. d'Auria, Naples, 1937, II, 17. 
15 G.r. Stout, A :Manual of Psychology, Hinds & Nobel, New York, 
1899, 104. 
(i • 
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acts, a Thomist is forced to deny. If through a procesiof 
deduction a cause is assigned to a certain effect or group of 
effects, there is offered at least a partial explanation of the 
phenomena by assigning the source of their causation. Moreover, 
this cause or principle or agent producing the effeots must of 
necessity be real and existing, because the effeot iB real and 
existing. Therefore the postulation of the soul as the prin-
ciple agent, and of the faoulties as the channels or instruments 
of that agency, is simply a response to the demands of reason, 
and, consequently, ~ offer at least a partial philosophio 
explanation. 
However, as intimated above, no intelligent soholastic 
philosopher would claim that the ooncept of faoulty offers a 
soientifio explanation of the processes of conscious acts. 
Faculties assist in assigning the cause of conscious acts; they 
do not attempt to explain the prooesses. Explanation of the 
process is a task that pertains more to science than to phil-
osophy. Sully saw the distinction but failed to draw the proper 
conolusion. 
The discussion of the ultimate nature of the 
socalled faoulties and powers of the mind be-
longs to rational psyohology, or that branch 
of philosophy which treats of mind as sub-
stanoe. The hypothesis of faoulties can, 
however, be criticized from the point of 
view of empirioal psychology in so far as 
it succeeds or does not Buooeedl~n giving a 
olear acoount of the phenomena. 
16 Sully. 25-26. 
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It is preoisely the failure of modern soientifio p~yohol­
ogiete to understand olearly the distinotion between philosophio 
and soientifio psyohology, that has oaused them to berate the 
faoulties for failure to offer the type of explanation that 
they were never intended to offer. Moreover, many of our 
modern soientifio psyohologists unfortunately went to the 
extreme in denying to the faoulties any explanatory power what-
ever, a position whioh, for reasons given above, must of 
neoessity be rejeoted. 
OBJECTION III FACULTIES DESTROY THE UNITY OF THE SOUL 
Explicit statements that the theory of faoulties destroys 
the unity of the eoul are rather infrequent, yet many oritioisms 
reductively allege that objeotion. Thus, nearly all desoriptions 
of faoulties as "pigeon holes," "oompartments," "parte of a 
maohine," "oells of a storage battery," eto., implioitly oon-
oeive of them as oomponents of the mind, thus destroying the 
essential unity of the mind. The following is an example in 
point, from Thorndike: 
The mind is regarded as a maohine of whioh 
the different faoulties are parts. Exper- ': 
ienoe being thrown in at one end, perception 
peroeives them, discrimination tells them 
apart, memory retains them and so on ••• Or, 
in a still cruder type of thinking, the mind 
is a storage battery Which oan be loaded with 
will power, or intellect, or judgment, giving17 the individual 'a surplus of mind to expend.' 
17 Thorndike, 236-237. 
Sl 
This objection to the faculties as destroying the ~ity of 
the soul, when directed against certain "faculty psychologies," 
is not without some justification. Kant appears to succeed 
pretty well in departmentalizing the mind; and, acoording to 
Ueberweg, Beneke, altbough opposed to the "innate abstract 
'faculties of the soul'," beld that tbe truly elementary 
, 
faoulties "are the elements of the substanoe of the soul it-
self; [that] they are not inherent in a substratum distinot 
from themselves. A thing is only the sum of its own oombined 
foroes."lS 
However, when directed against the conoept of faculty 
aocording to St. Thomas, this objeotion is baseless. For St. 
Thomas olearly shows that the faculties are 'acoidents', and 
that it is the essential apptitude of an accident to exist in a 
substance. NOw, the addition of accidents to a substance does 
in no way create a division in the substance or cause it to be-
come multiple. To anyone acquainted with soholastic terminology 
this conclusion is obvious. Oonsequently, the concept of faculty 
in no way mars the essential simplicity of the soul. On the 
contrary, this concept of faculty, by accounting for the diver-
sity of conscious acts without demanding that the ultimate prin-
Ciple of these aots be itself diverse, in reality protects and 
defends the soul's essential unity and simplicity. 
lS Friedrioh Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Soribner, Armstrong 
& 00., New York, lS77, II, 2S6. 
OBJEOTION IV FAOULTY PSYOHOLOGY HAS IMPEDED THE PROGRE§S 
OF SOIENTIFIO PSYOHOLOGY 
S2 
This is an objection that is hard to &nswer, because it 
appears to be, at least to a certain extent, justified. Faculty 
psychology, especially the orthodox faculty psychology of the 
St. Thomas, has a certain air of finality about it that tends 
to discourage further research. Oertain processes are attributed 
to certain faculties,and that seems to end the matter; there 
seems to be little else that need be or can be said about it. 
On studying without favor or affection the 
whole typical development of psychology as 
based on the notion of faculties, it is 
hard to resist the impression that these 
have often been treated as if they supplied 
psychology with its main end and brought it 
to a full stop. When once any mental 
operation has been assigned to and swallowed 
up in its appropriate faculty, the last 
word 1s taken to have been said about it. 
In particular there is no further need 
felt for either analysis or synthesiS. In 
this way the determining of the faculties 
has in good truth seemed to paralyse further 
inquiry; it has left the science of the 
psyche more or less stunted and ineffective.19 
This statement by Spearman is one which we might expect to have 
been made by almost anyone but himself. For besides being a" 
generous defender of the "faculties," he has done perhaps more 
than any other modern psychologist to develop the science of 
psychology along solidly progressive lines. He is undoubtedly 
the finest modern example we have of one who did not waste his 
19 Spearman, I, 193. 
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time, as so many others did, in opposing a faoulty psyo.~logy 
that is metaphysioally sound. Rather he recognized the value 
of the metaphysical explanation of the causation of conscious 
phenomena, and then, as a true sCientist, prooeeded to analyze 
oarefully the aotual processes of conscious phenomena. Accord-
ingly, a criticism of such a nature, coming from such an 
authority, demands more than the usual consideration. 
A Thomistic psychologist is willing to admit that the 
dootrine of faculties does possess an air of finality simply 
because metaphysical solutions are supposed to be 'final' 
(i.e., ultimate), else they would not be metaphysioal. Un-
fortunately, however, too many psychologists for too long a 
time did not realize that orthodox faoulty psychology is meta-
physical and not scientific. Faculty psychology in itself did 
not so much discourage scientific research; it simply did not 
bother about it, because such research was not necessary in 
order to arrive at the metaphysical solutions at which the 
philosopher was aiming. The soientific psyohologists, however, 
by negleoting to conduct extensive scientific research into 
mental processes, failed to develop their science to any great 
extent. The cause, therefore, of lack of progress in scientific 
psychology may be attributed not so much to the "finality" of 
metaphysical faculty psychology, as to the failure of scientific 
psychologists to develop their science by extensive and inten-
sive research. Fortunately, within the last few decades this 
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research has been made. Scientific psychology has mad~'great 
progress. The result has been that contemporary psychology is 
in a position to combine the best of philosophic thought with 
the extensive date of scientific research, and thus to syn-
thesize psychology into the discipline in which "the philosopher 
makes his contribution by defining the essence of man, setting 
forth the essential distinction of his powers, analyzing the 
nature underlying his habits and acts; [and in WhiCh] the 
sCientist makes his contribution by investigating the phenomenal 
correlations among human operations, and discovering thereby 
the material and accidental determinants of his habits and 
powers. H20 
20 R.E. Brennan, O.P., Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan, New York 
1941, Introduction by Mortimer Adler, xi. 
OHAPTER VI 
OONOLUSION 
.' 
The problem as it was conceived at the outset was to deter-
mine, in view of the widespread opposition among the moderns to 
the concept of mental faculty, whether the Thomistic Schoolmen 
were propounders of philosophical nonsense and dispensers of 
empty verbalisM in proposing a faculty theory, or whether the 
moderns themselves were either erroneous or laboring under a 
misoonoeption of the theory in repudiating it. The findings 
of this thesis seem to warrant the oonolusion that a large 
portion of the opposition to the faoulty oonoept is rooted in 
two prinoiple oauses, error and misoonoeption. 
The prevailing nominalism running through modern non-
soholastio philosophy oombined with the peouliar dootrines of 
the various philosophio systems, produced a conoootion of error 
inoompatible with a "realistio" faoulty oonoept. Whatever of 
that oonoept remained subsequent to this diSintegration of 
'" .. ~ 
philosophy beoame either so mangled and distorted, or so 
radioally ohanged, that it found little if any resemblanoe to 
the Thomistio oonoept. The predominant nominalism of later 
writers, together with the distorted view they had of the 
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faculty concept, gave rise to misconceptions which in turn were 
productive of the flood of ridicule heaped upon the faculty 
concept. 
Early modern philosophers, then, such as Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibnitz, opposed the ThomistiC concept of faculty 
because it was inconsistent with their oWn peculiar systems. 
A large body of subsequent criticisms of the notion of faculty, 
had it source not in any absurdity latent in the Thomistic 
theory itself, but in the absurdities evident in caricatures of 
the faculty concept. Moreover, when psychology itself abandoned 
philosophy, and substituted the physical and epiphenomenal for 
the metaphysical, the Thomistic notion of faculty, which is 
essentially metaphysical, was scrapped, and labeled antique, 
naive, and at best meaningless. 
This thesis made no attempt to establish the validity of 
the Thomistic concept of faculty. Its purpose was to examine 
that concept in the light of the opposition against it. As a 
result of this investigation it seems safe to draw the conclu-
sion that the Thomistic concept of faculty is as valid tod~y as 
when it came from the pen of St. Thomas, and that most, if not 
all, subsequent OPPOSition has done little or nothing to jar 
it from the place it holds in the metaphysics. of the soul. 
-.. -'----~ .. --
~ 
APPENDIX 
Since the time of Herbart, who was supposed to have sounded 
the death knell for faculty psychology, the moribund faculties 
have been derided, abused, ridiculed, and ignored. Any author 
who referred to them was out of date. Any serious use of them 
was anathematized. Yet somehow or other, without anyone's 
even trying to present an organized defense, they have survived. 
Thorndike, of Oolumbia University, in his extensive exper-
imentation tried hard to disprove anything like a faculty psy-
chology. Spearman, on the other hand, using some of the exper-
imental data of Thorndike, the findings Which he himself had 
made, and the data of other experimentalists, bas reached 
conclusions from this vast range of experimental data, that have 
proved on a purely scientific basis the validity of the theory, 
whioh, on a metaphYSical baSiS, St. Thomas and the host of 
earlier philosophers bad established oenturies before. l 
The faculty psyohology propounded by St. Thomas is a " 
metaphysical or philosophical diSCipline. Modern psyohology 
1 An excellent outline of this modern experimental phase of 
mental abilities is contained in O.A. Hart's, The Thomistio 
Ooncept of Mental Faculty, Oath. Un1v. of Amerioa, 
Washington, D.O., 1930, 119 sqq. 
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revolted against philosophy largely because the only pa1losophy 
it knew was the bewildering mass of conflicting modern phil-
osophies. For revolting against such prostitutions of human 
knowledge, we can hardly blame them. Divorced, therefore, from 
the guiding and regulating influence of sound philosophy, the 
modern experimental and scientific psychologists wandered about, 
lost in the maze of their own research. However, in recent 
years scientific psychology, so long groping in the dark, has 
begun to see the path to progress. It has come to see that it 
has much to gain by accepting the conclusions of correot phil-
osophy. Modern research correlated with sound metaphysics has 
been found both to corroborate the conclusions of metaphysics 
and to profit by the guiding influence of sound philosophy. 
It is not to be supposed, of course, that metaphysics has 
nothing to profit from the factual date of modern research. 
Metaphysics is nothing if it is not an attempt to explain facts 
in their ultimate causes. Hence facts can always be of service 
to metaphysics. Of course, the fundamental aspects of the meta-
physics of the soul will not change, for they are based upon 
the obvious facts of human nature, which were the same at the 
time of the first philosopher as they will be at the time of 
the last. Nevertheless, the more detailed knowledge of human 
experience presented by scientific psychology cannot help being 
of assistance to metaphysics, which, if it is sound, should, 
when neoessary, alter its oonclusions in the light of ~nown 
faots. 
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Soientific and philosophic psychology then, can be and 
should be of immense assistance to each other, and there has 
probably been no field of research where this has been and Will 
be more olearly shown than in the field of "faoulty psychology." 
.' 
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